Emission trading: evaluation of the European experience by Řízková, Markéta
 
 
Univerzita Karlova v Praze 
Fakulta sociálních věd 
 
Institut ekonomických studií 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rigorózní práce 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009                 Markéta Řízková 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Univerzita  Karlova  v Praze 
Fakulta sociálních věd 
 
Institut ekonomických studií 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIGORÓZNÍ  PRÁCE 
 
 
Emission Trading: 
 Evaluation of the European Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vypracovala:   Mgr. Markéta Řízková 
Vedoucí:    Mgr. Milan Ščasný, PhD. 
Akademický rok:  2008 - 2009 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prohlášení 
 
Prohlašuji, že jsem rigorózní práci vypracovala samostatně a použila pouze uvedené 
prameny a literaturu 
 
 
V Praze, dne 15.února, 2009          
          
Markéta Řízková 
 
 4 
 
 
 
ABSTRAKT 
 
Cílem práce je podat komplexní pohled na mechanismus emisního obchodování a 
zaměřit se na diskutované oblasti fungování zvláště evropského systému emisního 
obchodování (EU ETS) jako příkladu největšího fungující zavedeného systému 
emisního obchodování. Základní přístupy analýzy jsou jak teoretické tak praktické. 
V teoretické části se zaměříme na porovnání aplikace emisního obchodování versus 
environmentálních daní a budeme diskutovat, kdy je lepší regulovat pomocí nástrojů 
zaměřených na cenu a kdy na regulaci množství. Dále se teoreticky zaměříme na 
metody alokace používané v emisním obchodování se zvláštním důrazem na alokaci 
pomocí aukcí, která je teoreticky nejvíce preferovaná. V praktické části provedeme 
analýzu alokačních metod v rámci Fáze 1 a Fáze 2 systému EU ETS a shrneme jaké 
jsou očekávané změny v systému EU ETS po roce 2012. Na závěr zhodnotíme 
výsledky alokace versus emise ve Fázi 1 (2005-2007) a na základě predikcí 
ekonomického růstu a  emisní intenzity odhadneme další vývoj ve Fázi 2 (2008-
2012) a v následující fázi po roce 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Our aim is to show complex picture and highlight the most discussed features of the 
emission trading and especially the functioning of the European System of Emission 
Trading (EU ETS) as a representative of the biggest functioning emission trading 
system. The key approaches involved in our analysis are both theoretical and 
practical. In the theoretical section we compare emission trading and environmental 
taxes and we discuss when it is better to regulate by price and when by quantity 
instruments. We will discuss the possible allocation methods and especially method 
of auctioning as the most theoretically preferred allocation method. The practical 
approach will tackle following two aspects: how the emission allowances have been 
allocated within the EU ETS in Phase 1 and Phase 2 and what the planned changes 
are in post 2012. Finally, we will look at the results of allocation versus emission 
during the first trading period in years 2005-2007 and how it might look in the future 
in Phase 2 and beyond. 
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Methodology 
 
Economic instruments of environmental regulation are recently becoming more 
widely used in the environmental policy mix in developed countries. One of such 
economic instruments is trade of emission allowances/permits among economic 
actors or whole states. Such emission trading is becoming widely used especially in 
case of regulation of air pollution combating the growth of CO2 or SO2 emission. The 
initial allocation of the emission permits can significantly influence the effectiveness 
of the system and have different implication for the system participants. In my thesis 
I would like to deal with the question of what would be the efficient allocation 
strategy that would create efficient regulatory environment with minimal adverse 
effects on the system participants. 
 
 
Short outline of the thesis 
 
1. Introduction to the topic 
 
- Short description of the economic instruments of environmental regulation. 
Brief Introduction to the current situation of global policy of GHG emission 
reduction (e.g. UNCFF, Kyoto protocol) and its local implication  (EU ETS). 
Literature review. 
 
2. Experiences with allocation strategies 
 
- Grandfathering, benchmarking and auctioning  - basic description, experiences 
of their realization and assessment of the possible effects of alternative 
allocation approaches 
 
The choices of initial allocation can affect the overall workings of the cap-and-
trade program. The attention will be given to methods such as grandfathering 
based upon historical emissions and benchmarks based upon emission rates – 
both of which involve allowances for free to program participants. Special 
attention will be given to the third method:  Auctioning of allowances based on 
the paid allocation of allowances. 
 
3. Methods for using and distributing auction revenues  
 
- funding, recycling, changing tax structure – their possible positive/negative 
impacts on different market participants 
 
Theoretical evaluations of auction alternatives often assume that these revenues 
would be used to reduce other distorting taxes leading to possible “double 
dividend”. However, the attention will be paid also to other possibilities for use of 
revenues: e.g. funding specific activities (e.g. use of renewable resources, energy 
efficiency) or returning the revenues to program participants 
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4. Possible (efficient) portfolio of allocation options and the role of 
auctioning in the EU emission trading program after 2012 
 
- Possible hybrid portfolio options (allowances for free and auctioning)  that may 
imply efficient environmental regulation. Possible scenario of further 
development of ETS after the end of Phase II. in 2012 
 
The EC will be probably considering the expanded use of auctioning in the period 
after 2012. The attention will be paid to possible option that are available and 
their judgment on light of their possible regulatory effectiveness 
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Introduction  
 
Environmental protection and regulation have been gaining the attention both of the 
academics and politicians over the last half of the century. We have witnessed slow 
but steady move from the pure theoretical Pigouvian concept of internalization of 
externalities to well developed system of real-life regulatory sophisticated 
instruments. There is noticeable a general progress towards more market-based 
instruments of environmental regulation – especially environmental taxes or system 
of emission trading. Finally, in the last decade the environmental regulation has 
become a spotlighted issue on all levels of political debate in relation to the 
phenomenon of climate changes and the greenhouse gas emissions.   
As we said before, there is a variety of policy instruments that can be implemented; 
however, there is no single one that would score the best in all the evaluation criteria 
(Goulder and Parry, 2008). We have chosen one example of market-based 
environmental regulation: emission trading. We try to evaluate it, both theoretically 
and practically on the example of the European emission trading system (EU ETS). 
The reason of choice is triggered by the author’s appetite for deep understanding of 
policy instrument that currently become a real global policy in the field of combating 
climate change and has established completely new and rapidly growing world-wide 
carbon emission market that in 2007 already reached the financial value trades of 
nearly €50 billion (Capoor, 2008). 
To briefly summarize our purpose: it is to look on emission trading from different key 
perspective and to provide a reader not a overwhelming analysis of a single aspect of 
the chosen regulatory instrument but rather to provide a spectrum of different views 
on emission trading. Our aim is to show complex picture and highlight the most 
discussed features of the emission trading and especially the EU ETS as a 
representative of the biggest functioning emission trading system. 
The key approaches involved in our analysis are both theoretical and practical. In the 
theoretical section we will provide a reader with a comparison of emission trading 
and environmental taxes – and a discussion when it is better to regulate by price and 
when by quantity-focused instruments (Chapter 2). Later on, we will discuss the 
possible allocation methods with special attention paid to auctioning as the most 
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theoretically preferred allocation method (Chapter 3).  The reason why we have 
chosen an allocation method for detailed analysis is that the method of allocation of  
allowances is very crucial for the functioning of the system. Apart from that, as we 
will see in the practical part, allocation method is highly discussed issue in debate 
concerning the future design of the emission trading system in the EU.  
Then, the practical approach will tackle following two aspects: how the emission 
allowances have been allocated within the EU ETS in Phase 1 and Phase 2 and what 
the planned changes in the future are (Chapter 3). And finally we will look at the 
results of this allocation during the first trading period in years 2005-2007 (Chapter 
4) and how it might look in the future with the planned changes mentioned before 
(Chapter 4). 
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1. Corner Stones of Emission Trading and Environmental 
Taxes   
 
The first chapter is meant as a brief introduction to the topic of economic instruments 
of environmental regulation with the main focus directed to the description of 
emission trading, its theoretical rationale and practical usage accompanied with the 
similar introduction to the topic of environmental taxes with special focus on carbon 
taxes. The goal of this chapter is to answer basic questions as: What are the 
economic instruments of environmental regulation? What are their advantages and 
disadvantages and how theoretically and where practically does system of tradable 
permit or carbon taxes work?  
There are several types of instruments used by environmental policy nowadays: 
traditional pollution standards following the command-and-control measures, 
economic incentives such as environmental taxes and charges or tradable emission 
rights and quotas, subsidies or voluntary instruments (e.g. environmental 
management system and auditing or covenants – voluntary agreement between 
industry and government). There is not a single optimal instrument that would be 
efficient and sufficient in all situations, in the real world there exist combination both 
of traditional direct regulation via limits, environmental standards or emission 
concentration and more indirect regulation via economic instruments based on 
internalization of external cost – externalities, that used to be omitted in the 
economic calculation. 
While the tools of direct command-and–control regulation can be applicable in 
most of the cases, their efficiency may be limited. Their biggest advantage is a 
certain outcome as the polluter’s compliance is mandatory and often accompanied 
with sanctions for breach of the standards/limits. On the other hand, the biggest 
drawback is their inflexibility and static approach. They do not take into account that 
each polluter faces different abatement cost instead of this they treat each polluter 
with the same measure. They focus only on the present state-of-art but they lack the 
dynamic incentive effect. Once the polluter reaches the required limit or standard 
there is not any encouragement for further improvement. Moreover, in the most 
cases command-and-control regulation is technology dictating so that it does not 
leave any space for new innovative approach. 
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On the other hand, the market-based instruments such as environmental taxes, 
charges, subsidies or tradable permits represent a decentralized indirect incentive 
system of regulation. The majority of economists favor them for their cost-efficiency. 
In the presence of the bounded rationality the regulator does not know the real 
abatement costs of the individual firm, therefore the intentions of the regulator are 
transmitted via changes into the price system, i.e. via modification of relative prices. 
Figure 1 : Environmental Policy Options  
 
Market-based instruments represent the efficient solution in case when the individual 
abatement costs differ significantly among the polluters. The environmental benefits 
are assumed to achieve the abatement at the lowest level of costs – polluters will 
pollute up to the point where the marginal abatement costs (MAC) are equal the price 
of taxes/charges/pollution permits levied on them. If the MAC of abatement activity 
is less than the regulation instrument polluter can abate another unit of pollution. On 
the other hand, if the MAC is higher than the regulation instrument, it is cheaper to 
pay the tax. Finally, those firms with lowest abatement costs will undertake the most 
pollution abatement and firms that reduce emissions in more costly way will choose 
paying tax or buying more emission permits. 
In general we can divide the economic instruments into two basic groups according 
to their main target of regulation. Instruments regulating the price of pollution (as 
taxes, charges or subsidies) and instruments focusing on regulation of quantity of 
pollution (tradable pollution permits/allowances). The incentives of the market-based 
instruments are transmitted via price system; they change the relative prices via 
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making the polluting activities more costly. This can be beneficial and dangerous in 
the same time. It is effective to use them in case of heterogeneous polluters with 
differing marginal abatement costs that respond to the price signals – especially for 
recycling and material and energy saving. However, in the same time there is a 
danger that they may provide too weak stimulus so that the industry response is 
uncertain. 
The great advantage of the market-based instruments is that they differ from the 
direct regulation in their inherent orientation at the dynamic incentives – they create 
a continual incentive for firms to further reduce polluting emissions beyond the set 
limits. Accordingly, there is a constant stimulus for the better polluter’s performance. 
1.1. Transferable rights - Theoretical view 
The problem of missing property rights and its impact on the level of pollution is 
usually known as “tragedy of commons” introduced to the economic literature by 
Garret Hardin in late 1960ties1. Usually it represents the situation of markets failure 
where the emission rights produce the over-exploitation of the natural resources or 
and over-emission of the local/global environment.  
The theoretical issue of transferable permits of property rights as a solution for 
external cost of usage of collective resource was greatly tackled by Coase (1960) and 
later Demsetz (1964). Both authors were dealing with the idea of direct bargaining 
among the involved agents as a way of solution, i.e. bargaining without the presence 
of regulator on the market. The theory of transferring of tradable property rights in 
the presence of some regulator was introduced by Dales (1968) (water use 
regulation) and later followed by Croker (1966) and mainly Tietenberg (1985) 
focusing on the theory of pollution markets and emission permits.  
In general, the transferable rights can be useful either in case of usage/exploitation 
of some natural resources or in case of emitting pollution into the environment. To 
better understand the effect of introduction of tradable rights into the system we can 
show it on the example of tradable rights with pollution, that are more common in 
the current environmental regulation. The general well pronounced advantage of 
                                                 
1 Hardin, Garret. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162, 1243-1248. However, the idea of price of 
common goods goes far back in the history to Aristotle... 
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tradable pollution permit mentioned by the economists is that the usage of such 
economic instrument will lower the total pollution abatement costs.  
We can show graphically in Figure 2 how permits affect the polluters with different 
marginal abatement costs. For both polluters it holds that the curve of marginal 
abatement costs is increasing which means that every additional unit of abated 
emission is more expensive (represented by greater Q on horizontal axis) than the 
previous one. However, each polluter has differently shaped marginal cost of 
reduction, i.e. the same amount of abated pollution will cost differently each 
producer.  
Figure 2 :  Economic logic of tradable pollution permits 
(Application on CO2 permits) 
 
 
Source: OECD/IEA (2001) 
In the Figure 2 the Polluter 1 on the left-hand side has higher marginal abatement 
cost expressed by the shape of  the curve, Q* is the amount of abated pollution 
whose marginal costs of abatement are equal to the permit price P*, to reach the 
higher level of abatement Q (the objective of the environmental regulation) would 
cost more than to buy additional units of pollution permits, therefore economically 
thinking polluter will abate just till the level of abatement Q* and will buy additional 
units of pollution permits to cover the difference QQ*. Area A represents the cost 
savings reached by buying permits.  
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On the other hand, the Polluter 2 on the right-hand side will reach at price of 
pollution permit P* level Q´* of abatement even though his/her objective of level of 
abatement was only Q´ and he/she will sell the difference Q´Q* to Polluter 1. 
Shaded area B expresses the profits from selling the permits. Both polluters have 
chosen the level of abatement where the marginal costs are equal to the price of 
permit, the overall level of abatement was reached but with lower costs for 
producers. 
Environmental regulation tries to target through introducing the tradable permits 
either absolute or relative quantitative limits of pollution, we can distinguish between 
two most important groups of tradable permits so-called credits for emission 
reductions (in baseline-and-credit schemes with minimum performance principles) 
and quotas for allocated amount of emissions (in currently more often used “cap-
and-trade” schemes, where polluters receive allowances/permits to produce certain 
amount of pollution).  
There are various methods of allocation of emission tradable permits that will be 
described more in detail in the following chapters. Just briefly mention them: 
emission permits can be allocated for free i.e. grandfathered according to either the 
historical levels of pollution or using some benchmark, or they can be sold, i.e. 
auctioned.  
1.2. Transferable rights in practice 
As was already mentioned before, we can roughly differ between to main streams of 
application of transferable rights: the area of usage of some natural resources and 
the area of pollution. Transferable rights related to air pollution have over years 
become the most common area of practical application even though the usage of 
transferable rights related to natural resources has much older experience. Such 
transferable rights were for example used in relation to trading rights to abstract 
water (e.g. to set the balance between the usage of water for farming and other 
purposes) in the USA, Australia, Chile (Kraemer, Banholzer, 1999). Other examples 
were systems of tradable rights or quotas for river or sea fishing2 in a number of 
countries as Australia, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and USA since 
                                                 
2 E.g. there was set up the agreement between British and Norwegian whalers to set quotas and limits on the whaling 
season in Antarctica already in 1932. The quotas were meant to be transferable but without any price. (OECD, 
2001) 
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1970ties (Wallis, 1999). Other example use transferable rights related to natural 
resources are programs for land-use management that are most often called 
transferable development rights schemes. They have been used to preserve historic 
landmarks, agricultural land and biodiversity, to encourage development, or to limit 
some certain types of activities within an area. There are experiences in their 
application in the USA, France, Italy and New Zealand; however the only extensive 
use has been undergone for development (or building) rights in the USA (Renard, 
1999).  
Our primary focus is on the tradable pollution rights (or emission allowances) 
therefore we will not go into detail in description of transferable right related to 
natural resources. In general we can differ between three main groups of practical 
usage of tradable pollution rights according to the target of regulation: pollution of 
water as the first group, air pollution as the second one focusing mainly on the 
regulation of SO2 and NOX substances in the air and finally climate change issues as 
the last main group targeting the reduction of green house gases (GHG) in the air. 
The first two mentioned groups had their origin of practical application in the USA 
already in the 70ties of 20th century. Whereas the last group, the “youngest one”, 
was first put into the practice in late 90ties in the UK and later in the EU in 2005 
within the introduction of the EU ETS. On the global scale this kind of environmental 
regulation is represented by the flexible mechanisms of Kyoto Protocol. The more 
detailed description of the concrete projects of tradable pollution systems can be 
found e.g. in OECD (2002) or EEA (2006); at this point we will present the tables and 
rough information summarizing the most important existing systems of tradable 
permits. Later, in the following chapters we will chose the most important systems of 
tradable emission rights and we will dedicate them more attention. 
1.2.1. Pollution of water   
Generally the development of waste, land and water tradable pollution rights systems 
have the longest experience in the USA. The comprehensive summary of recent 
system of water quality trading systems counting with the list of over 45 local 
applications on rivers (e.g. Minesota River) or bay areas (e.g. San Francisco Bay) 
provides Breetz et al. (2004) also on the EPA3 summarize that there is currently 
                                                 
3 See Internet Sources on EPA Water Quality trading programs 
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applied statewide trading water quality framework in 7 states in other two states 
there is watershed specific trading program. In practice the individual water quality 
trading systems applied in the United State are targeted at different pollutant e.g. 
Selenium, Mercury, Phosphorus or Nitrogen. Theoretical approaches summary can be 
found in Keudel (2006). 
1.2.2. Air pollution 
The regulation of air pollution by tradable pollution rights began in the USA in mid 
1970ties via so-called Emission Trading Program that consisted of various initiatives 
(so-called bubbles, netting, offsets, and banking4) as part of the Clean Air Act’s 
program5. There was introduced an obligation for new sources of air pollution and 
existing sources that wanted to expand their facilities, to offset additional emissions 
in the area by acquiring emission allowances from existing sources. This program was 
gradually widened by other programs. 
To mention the historically most successful example of the emission trading we have 
to refer to the USA Acid Rain Program, first large-scale, long-term US emission 
trading program that was established by the amendments to the Clear Air Act in 
1990. The practical system of trading of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emission from utilities 
was then introduced in 1994. The program has been very successful, exceeding the 
target at a cost much lower than predicted (Ellerman et al., 2004).  The program is 
operating till nowadays. This program also served as important example for 
establishing the European System of Emission Trading (EU ETS) focused on the 
reduction of greenhouse gases in 2005 that will by in the centre of our attention in 
the following chapters 
 
 
                                                 
4 Bubbles :enabled various sources to reach the one reduction target jointly as they were treated as a “bubble”  
Netting: similar to bubbles. Only in case of total net emissions of the group are lower than the regulatory threshold it 
could enable to existing sources of pollution expand  
Offsets : to build new sources in the heavily polluted areas that are trespassing the regulatory threshold can be done 
only if the polluter buy credits more than equal to their emissions 
Banking: allows polluters to store the credits over time 
5 The Clean Air Act (CAA) was passed in 1963 but it has undergone important revisions periodically since then. The 
present air pollution control program in the USA is based on the 1970 version of the law and on the far-reaching 
revisions introduced under the 1990 Amendments for improving local air quality ( UNEP/UNCTAD, 2002) 
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Table 1 : More recent application of the Air Pollution Emission Trading Programs 
 (Excluding Greenhouse Gases) 
Program / Country Period Participants Economic and Environmental 
results  
Lead in gasoline 
Lead in Gasoline / USA 1982 - 1987 Refineries Faster reduction of lead in 
gasoline  
Annual savings up to $250 mil  
Ozone Depleting Substances 
U.S. ODS Phase-out6 / USA 1989 - 1998 28 major U.S. producers and 
consumers of the controlled 
substances 
Faster fulfillment of the reduction 
goals 
 
SO2 
Acid Rain Program / USA  
(21 states) 
Phase 1: 1995  - 
1999 
Phase 2 : 2000 - 
now 
coal-fired U.S. electric  
utilities 
 Phase 1: 445 installations 
Phase 2 over 2000 installations 
Faster fulfillment of the reduction 
goals 
Annual savings up to $250 bn 
California RECLAIM / California 
(USA) 
1994 - 2003 wide range of sectors emitting 
SO2 and NOX 
Faster fulfillment of the reduction 
goals 
 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)/ 
29 states 
2005 - now sectors emitting SO2 
SO2 and NOx  
 
n.a. 
Emission Quotas SO2/ Slovakia  2004 - now sectors emitting SO2 
200 participants 
n.a. 
NOx 
Ozone Transport Commission 
(OTC) NOx Budget Program / 
USA (13 countries USA) 
1999 - 2002 fossil-fuel-fired boilers and 
electricity generating units  
n.a. 
California RECLAIM / California 
(USA) 
1994 - 2003 fossil-fuel-fired boilers and 
electricity generating units 
n.a. 
United States EPA SIP Call – 
Federal NOX Budget Trading 
Program 7 / USA (13 states) 
 
2003 - now fossil-fuel-fired boilers and 
electricity generating units 
n.a. 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)/ 
26 states USA 
2005 - now sectors emitting SO2 
SO2 and NOx  
 
n.a. 
NOx emission trading/ The 
Netherlands 
2005 - now large combustion plants  n.a. 
Mercury 
Clean Air Mercury Rule / 
 USA (29 states) 
 
2005 – now 
(2018) 
Coal Power stations n.a. 
Source: Harrison, Radov (2002), EEA (2005, Stavins (1998),), EPA, (see internet sources) 
                                                 
6 Trading system implemented as a fulfillment of Montreal Protocol that was signed by the USA in 1987  
7 replacement of previous Ozone Transport Commission NOx Program  
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Table 1 summarizes the important features of the major relevant programs targeted 
on the regulation of air pollution in the USA and in later period also in Europe8. 
Targets of the regulation were polluting substances as lead in gasoline, ozone-
depleting substances, sulphur-dioxide emissions and nitrogen oxide emissions  
1.2.3. Climate Change 
The last area of practical implementation of the transferable emission rights are the 
issues related to climate change and growing concentration of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) in the atmosphere. These trading programs target the reduction of GHG 
emissions, i.e. focusing on the reduction of either only CO2 (e.g. EU ETS) or of all 
GHG emissions9 (e.g. under the Kyoto protocol). The trading unit is a tone of CO2, in 
case of the rest of GHG – there are traded units of tones of CO2e (i.e. equivalents of 
CO2) where the units of other GHG are changed in to equivalents according to their 
global warming potentials.  
How does differ the GHG emission impact from the impact of the air pollution gases 
mentioned in the previous section? It is really the global feature of their occurrence. 
Whereas the gases as SO2 or NOX do impact the local environment where they are 
emitted (e.g. by occurrence of acid rains or health problems of local citizens), GHG 
do influence the global environment and the atmosphere (according to the many 
scientists their higher concentration in the atmosphere may influence the growth of 
global temperatures10).  
Therefore the creation of global markets would be the most efficient solution for both 
environmental and economic reasons. From the environmental point of view it does 
not matter where the unit of GHG is abated. In the same time from the economic 
point of view there are more possibilities in the global market to find the cheaper way 
how to do it.  
                                                 
8 In Europe there is only a scarce evidence of emission programs focused on the air pollution (Slovakia and the 
Netherlands), the main development on the European scene is in the area of climate change and promoted by the 
functioning of European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that target the reduction of GHG. 
9 i.e. Six gases: CO2, CH4, N20, HFCs, PFCs and SF6. 
10 In this thesis we are not going to open the discussion whether this impact is true or whether the human activity do 
contribute to the growth of temperatures on the Earth. For more information readers may search e.g. in reports 
elaborated by the International Panel of Climate Change  
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Table 2 : Existing GHG Emission Trading Schemes 
Program Period Target group No. Participants Mandatory / Voluntary 
USA 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
Phase 1 : 
 2003 – 2006 
Phase 2 : 
 2007 -2010 
Electricity generation, 
manufacturing industry 
120 Voluntary 
Europe 
Denmark 
ETS 
2001 - 2003 Biggest  electricity producers  
 
8 Mandatory  
UK ETS 2002 -2006 Energy intensive industries. 
 
 Electricity generators 
excluded from cap-and-trade 
34 direct 
participants 
Voluntary 
 
(Firms could negotiate agreements with the 
government to achieve reduced emissions 
rate targets in exchange for a reduction in 
the Climate Change Levy CO2 emission 
regulation. Targets can be achieved via 
trading.) 
 
Norway 
ETS 
2005 – 2007, 
from 2008 linked 
to EU ETS 
Coverage as the EU ETS: 
Mainly industry (energy 
facilities above 20 MW, 
cement, refineries and 
some others) 
51 Mandatory for plants not under CO2 tax 
EU ETS Phase 1 : 
2005 - 2007 
Phase 2 :  
2008 -2012 
Energy Facilities above 20 
MW, heating, cement, 
refineries. Iron/steel, pulp and 
paper 
Around 10.800 Mandatory 
Swiss 
ETS 
Start from 
January 2008 
Installation covered by CO2 
taxation 
n.a. Mandatory – installations can choose 
between CO2 tax and ETS 
Australia 
New 
South 
Wales 
2003 Electricity generators 35 (of which 24 
obligatory 
participation)  
Voluntary & Mandatory 
Japan 
Japanese 
Voluntary 
Emissions 
Trading 
Scheme 
 
2005 - now Food and beverages, 
chemicals, paper and pulp, 
textile, building sector 
34 Voluntary 
Companies/facilities participate voluntarily 
by pledging concrete emissions reduction 
targets. The ministry subsidizes the 
installation cost of CO2 emissions reduction 
equipment to help businesses that are 
actively attempting to reduce CO2. 
International 
Kyoto 
protocol 
2008 -2012 Countries that are Signatories 
to the Kyoto protocol 
169 
signatories11 
 
Mandatory 
Source: Harrison, Radov (2002), Ellis, Tilpark (2006), various internet sources related to individual ETS 
                                                 
11 As of September 2, 2007 
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The carbon markets, the youngest ones in comparison of the other above mention 
markets for tradable pollution permits, are at the moment the most dynamically 
developing segment of the market of tradable pollution permits. Currently there has 
be operating several mandatory or voluntary emission trading programs in the USA, 
within the EU and Australia, Table 2 gives the short summary of their basic 
characteristics.  
Over the last 10 years the issues connected to climate change and global warming 
have become the crucial topics of global politics. The first formal response of the 
international politics was a declaration signed under the United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992; however it was just a declaration 
without any legally binding consequences. The initial legally mandating international 
agreement was signed in 1998 in Kyoto – the Kyoto protocol. It came to power in 
2005 and it has established the real global market for GHG emission allowances and 
credits. The Kyoto protocol served as an incentive to develop a global carbon market 
via number of different emission trading schemes and also via the development of 
project-based mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) that are examples of offset programs mentioned before. 
There are also many emission trading schemes focused on the cutting the 
greenhouse gas emission that are either announced or will be already introduced in 
very near future. Table 3 provides a general overview about the planned schemes. 
Generally, the greatest changes in the GHG emission regulation are expected in the 
USA. In 2009, there will be implemented a regional trading scheme among 10 states 
on the Eastern coast. Initiative is also apparent among the states on the western 
coast, even thought currently on the lower stage of development. There is also 
expected that in the future 8 years there will be implemented some kind of federal 
emission trading scheme as all the current U.S. candidates publicly support the 
market-based system of emission regulation. 
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Table 3 : Planned and announced GHG trading schemes 
 
Name Expected start General information 
USA 
RGGI  - Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative  
 
2009 5-7% of EU ETS allocation, energy sector covered with participation of 
200 installations. 
Mandatory auction: 25%(e.g. in New York 100% auction) 
 
Participating countries : Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island  
 
Western Climate Initiative 
 
?  Announced implementation of market-based emission regulation with 
emission trading and cooperation among the participating countries. 
 
Participating countries : Arizona, British Columbia, California, Manitoba, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington 
 
Federal U.S. Cap-and-trade 
system 
?? Several proposals in U.S. Congress of federal cap-and-trade scheme. 
The most important bills being discussed are:  Lieberman-Warner act 
and Bingaman-Spacer act. 
Australia 
NETTS 
National Emission trading 
Task force 
2010 The Government officially promised to implement emission trading 
scheme for power sector.  
 
New Zealand 
New Zealand (?) 2012  The Governmental intention to introduce an emission trading scheme 
for power sector.  
 
Source: various internet sources related to the individual trading schemes – see Internet sources, 
PointCarbon news 
 
1.2.3.a. Preliminary schemes: Denmark and the UK 
 
Historically, the first small scale emission trading schemes with GHG were established 
in Europe - in Denmark and in the UK. In Denmark, the system was designed only for 
8 firms where two biggest firms12 received 93% of all allocation (UNEP, 2002) 
therefore it did not create the sufficient condition to establish liquidity of market.  
Another thing was relatively low level of fine for non compliance due to (DKr 40 or 
around €5 per ton CO2)13  that also contributed to the limited effect of the whole 
system. 
                                                 
12 Elsam and Energi E2, 
13 According to the description mentioned in EU ETS Danish National Allocation Plan 2005 - 2007 
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It the UK, the emission trading system was a part of UK Climate Change Program to 
reduce its GHG emissions by 12.8% bellow 1990 by 2008.  The program introduced 
so-called Climate Change Agreements (CCA) with industry participant and offered the 
voluntary option to participate in the emission trading scheme as a parallel to CCA.  
There were two types of participants — direct participants who accept an absolute 
cap and Climate Change Agreement participants. Direct participants were required to 
make absolute reductions to 1998-2000 levels of their emissions in exchange for an 
incentive payment paid by UK Government. The targets and value of incentive 
payment were set via a competitive auction 2002, where companies were bidding for 
the absolute level of reduction target at given incentive payment. To explain it, firms 
were paid by government for the reduction they had achieved when they reached the 
level of abatement agreed in the auction. The system finished already in 2006, it was 
mainly meant as a useful learning tool for UK firms and Government to understand 
how trading works in preparation for the European-wide emission trading system (EU 
ETS). It has also resulted in some environmental improvement in terms of reducing 
some emissions that would otherwise have occurred, but some participants may have 
been paid for reductions that they would have made anyway (EEA, 2005). 
1.2.3.b. EU ETS –The global carbon market driver 
 
EU ETS was established in 200514 as a main instrument of EU Climate Change policy 
for achieving the EU target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with 
the Kyoto protocol commitment for the EU15. EU ETS has become the dominant 
element of the global carbon markets as it is the biggest emission trading scheme 
ever put into the practice in terms of countries involved (25 members of the EU in 
the 2005, 27 since 2007), in terms of individual installations covered (almost 10.500) 
and finally in terms of total amount of emission cap imposed (in the Phase 1: nearly 
2.200 Mt CO2 p.a.). In its initial phase it focused only on the reduction of single GHG 
– CO2, in its second phase (2008 – 2012) the scope of regulation encompasses also 
other GHG via import of emission credits of Kyoto protocol (see bellow)16.  It covers 
six most energy intensive industrial sectors (energy, heating, refinery, iron and steel, 
                                                 
14 According to ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) 
15 EU 15 has commitment to reduce its GHG by 8% till 2012 compared to the base year 1990; EU 12 has individual 
national targets in range of 6 - 8% reduction till 2012 from the same base year. 
16 The Kyoto Protocol encompasses all 6 major GHG emissions. E.g. also French NAP gives the opportunity to opt-in 
for chemical activities with other GHG, namely with N2O 
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cement, and pulp and paper production) and it represents about 45% of the total 
emissions of CO2 within the EU.  
Figure 3 : Comparison of size, type and status of different emission trading schemes 
 
Source: OECD (2006) 
 
It was designed to run in two separate phases between year 2005 -2007 and 2008 - 
2012. The second phase is in the same time the first commitment period for the 
Kyoto protocol.  It is highly probable that these two phases will have the continuation 
in post-2012 development; its main features are being frequently discussed at 
present. In January 2008 there was released by the European Commission the first 
official draft of the revision of EU ETS in post-2012 scheme giving the certainty that 
the emission trading system will continue even without the existence of any 
international agreement (as was the Kyoto protocol). 
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Table 4 : Global Carbon Markets: Traded volume and Value 
 
Source: Capoor (2007) 
 
EU ETS with is its size (current cap more than 2,200 Mt CO2) and number of 
participants (more than 10,500 installations) already offers the condition to establish 
the sufficient market liquidity. We can see in Table 3 the rapidly growing number of 
trades that was placed in the first two years of EU ETS trading. In the year 2007 the 
market is also following the same growth dynamics with most of the trades focused 
on trading the forward emission allowances for the next compliance period 2008 – 
2012.  
According to the latest numbers for year 2007, the total volume and value traded on 
the global carbon markets represent 64% and 80% growth respectively17 compared 
to the previous year. In total there was traded 2,700 Mt CO2e reaching total value 
€40.4 ban. Only within the EU ETS there was traded nearly 70% of the total financial 
and physical volume (€ 28 bln and 1,600 Mt CO2e) (PointCarbon, 2008). Trades were 
realized either on the official exchanges18 or bilaterally between concrete two parties 
and via specialized brokers on so-called OTC19 market. At the moment, the OTC 
markets represents the majority of current trades, e.g. within the EU ETS it counts 
for 70% of total trades (PointCarbon, 2008). 
 
 
                                                 
17 we count together numbers form Table 3 and Table 4 to express the total volumes of the carbon markets 
18 the most important for the EU ETS are exchanges ECX, EEX, Nordpool and Bluenext, for other trading schemes we 
can mention for example Chicago Climate Exchange 
19 Over-the-counter market 
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1.2.3.c. Kyoto protocol and its Flexible market mechanisms  
 
The aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to establish a real international co-operation in 
solving the climate change issues. The members of the emission trading system are 
the whole countries not the individual firms within the countries. Within the Kyoto 
protocol the signatories that represent the 39 developed economies (Annex 1 
countries20) committed to reach within the compliance period 2008 – 2012 their 
individual relative targets to its GHG emission in base year (for the majority it was 
year 1990). The rest of the signatories (non-Annex 1 countries) are represented by 
developing countries without any special reduction target. 
To reach their commitment Annex 1 countries have to reduce GHG emission via 
domestic abatement. Apart from that, they can also use so-called Flexible Mechanism 
of the Kyoto protocol that consist of international emission trading of Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) or usage of project based credits that cover the emission 
reductions in the developing world through so-called Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) or emission reduction from projects in more developed countries through the 
mechanism of so-called Joint Implementation (JI). However there must be kept a 
supplementary criterion that only 50% of the needed reduction can be reached by 
flexible mechanisms of Kyoto protocol.  
What can we imagine behind the project based credits? Let’s imagine a wind farm 
CDM project in China. The electricity generated from the wind farm would substitute 
electricity delivered to the grid from other coal-based power plants in China, this coal 
power plant would reduce its production and so it would produce less GHG emissions. 
There exist specialized methodologies approved by Kyoto Protocol Authority: 
UNFCCC21 to count how much GHG emission would be saved by doing so, these 
saved GHG emissions represents the volume of project based credits from CDM 
projects that can be used either by governments of Annex 1 countries within the 
Kyoto Protocol compliance or to some limit22 also by the companies within the EU ETS 
compliance.  
                                                 
20 Annex I of the UNFCCC signed in 1992 and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are often used interchangeably. 
21 United Nation Framework  Convention on Climate Change  
22 for EU ETS 2nd Phase trading period (2008 -2012) there is on average 13% limit of usage credits from JI or CDM 
counted as a percentage of installation allocation. More information in Annexes of this thesis 
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Table 5 summarizes the reached traded volume of theses credits that were traded. 
Again we can see the growing dynamic of the market. 
 
Table 5 : Trades with the project based transactions 
 
 
 
Source: Capoor (2007) 
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1.3. Environmental taxes in application to Climate Change in 
theoretical perspective 
 
The theory of environmental taxes goes back to the Pigouvian concept of 
environmental taxes that intends to internalize the external social cost imposed on 
the society by polluting activities. In this sense the optimal environmental tax should 
be equal to the total marginal social costs.23  
 
The second stage of the development of environmental taxation is its incorporation 
into the broader concept of environmental tax reform that shifts taxation from 
taxation of labor toward environmental taxation. The early theoretical concepts of 
environmental tax reform were apparent in the beginning of 80ties of last century, 
e.g. Binswanger (1983) mentioned an implementation of energy tax whose revenues 
could be used for reduction of taxation of labor.  This is exactly the principle of 
practical implementation of environmental reform that happened more than one 
decade later in several European countries. The concept of environmental tax reform 
was later broadly theoretically discussed mainly due to the issues of possible double 
dividend hypothesis – i.e. that change of the architecture taxation system would 
contribute both to the environmental benefits and to the distortion of tax system 
leading even to the boosting of employment. We tackle the topic environmental 
regulation with other taxes and regulatory instrument in section dedicated to the 
second-best analysis in Chapter 2.  
 
When we move towards the environmental taxes related to the climate change and 
the greenhouse gases we usually refer to taxes imposed on fuels and energy. In 
theoretical perspective we can differ between directions of energy taxes. Carbon 
taxes can be either based directly on the verified emissions or there can be used 
other less direct way of computing of their tax base. The taxes imposed on the motor 
fuels and taxes levied on other energy sources.  
 
In the first case the taxes on motor fuels are historically levied tax rate is supposed 
to be related either directly or less directly to the carbon dioxide content. Their aim is 
to reduce the energy consumption of the heavy carbon-intensive fuels.  
                                                 
23 more e.g. in OECD (2001) 
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1.4. Carbon taxes in practice 
 
In practice we can see implementation of carbon taxes either as an additional tax 
added into the fiscal system or as a part of the broader environmental fiscal reform. 
In total, during the last 20 years there have been implemented specialized carbon 
taxes in Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway), the Great Britain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Estonia and in 2005 also by Slovenia.  In 
all of these countries this implementation was to certain level accompanied by the 
reduction in other distortion taxes. For example in Germany, the complex 
environmental tax reform introduced tax rates for electricity and fossil fuels that were 
accompanied by the cuts in total social security contributions by almost 2%. 
 
Broadly speaking, we can mention at this place all taxes related to the energy 
products in general that implicitly in the same time also focus on taxation of the 
carbon-intensive fuels. The current situation of the energy tax harmonization within 
the EU member states sets the minimal energy tax rates for various energy fuels24, 
namely on motor fuels, all heating fuels and electricity with differentiated rates for 
business use and households. 
 
For comparison we can look at current tax rates for electricity and motor fuels to see 
the vast differences among countries depicted in following Figure 4 and Figure 5.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Council Directive 2003/96/EC – Energy taxation Directive 
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Figure 4 : Unleaded Petrol - Excise Duty rate  
(Rate applicable from January 2008) 
 
 
Source: DG TAXUD (2008) 
Note: Minimum Excise Duty: 359 EUR per 1000 liter according to Directive 2003/96/EC. Values in EUR at 
1/10/2007 
 
In practice, these energy rates still differ significantly as some member states keep 
the energy taxation on minimal prescribed levels25 and others have already imposed 
the tax rate many times higher than the mandatory minimum (especially 
Scandinavian countries). Different situation is also among the new member states, 
there most of the new EU10 still have the grace period for application of the minimal 
energy tax rates. The longest transition period have negotiated Poland, there the 
minimal tax rates will be applied in 2012, on the other hand the Czech Republic has 
already introduced the minimal energy tax rates in January 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Council Directive 2004/74/EC – amends the energy Directive as regards the possibility for the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia to apply temporary exemptions or 
reductions in the levels of taxation. 
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Figure 5 : Coal and Coke (heating "business use“) - Excise Duty  
(Rate applicable from January 2008) 
 Source: DG TAXUD (2008) 
Note: Minimum Excise Duty: Minimum excise duty: 0.15 EUR per gigajoule according to Directive 
2003/96/EC. Values in EUR at 1/10/2007 
 
Notably,  Figure 5 is showing the tax rates for coke for business use, there is 
evident the stringency in environmental regulation in Scandinavian countries – 
namely in Denmark (€ 8.29) and Sweden (€10.85) where there is in the final tax rate 
also included the CO2 tax.  
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2. The Choice of Tradable Pollution Rights or Environmental 
Taxes  
Tradable pollution rights/quotas and environmental taxes are nowadays common 
economical instruments of environmental regulation. The environmental regulation 
via taxes is a price based instrument. By imposing the tax we fix the marginal cost of 
compliance, however, we leave the final level of pollution uncertain. On the other 
hand, the quantity based instruments represented by tradable rights/quotas ensure 
the final level of pollution but leave the marginal compliance cost uncertain. 
In this chapter we will examine in detail the differences between their usages. The 
choice of a proper policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation.  
We can divide the chapter into two parts: an analysis in the so-called first-best 
setting where we will compare the instruments per se and secondly an analysis in the 
second-best setting where the comparison will be placed into the interaction with 
other existing taxes (i.e. income or sales taxes). We will examine the possible 
negative welfare impact of such interaction named tax-interaction effect as well. 
We will try to answer questions as: when is it preferable to use taxes and when are 
quotas more efficient? Would it be more efficient to use them both? Is there any 
difference in their impact on effectiveness of the system, competitiveness issues or 
dynamics of the technological change? 
2.1. First-best setting analysis 
2.1.1. Price or quantity regulation? 
As was already mentioned in the introductory chapter, economic instruments of 
environmental regulation can be suitable and efficient in case where the abatement 
costs vary among the different polluting firms and in case of asymmetric information, 
when the regulator does not have the sufficient information about the abatement 
costs of regulated firms. The pioneer work that compared the different efficiency 
outcomes of taxes and quotas in field of environmental regulation under the 
conditions of information uncertainty was elaborated by Weitzman (1974).  
In centre of Weitzman’s attention there were different relative sensitivities of costs of 
abatement and benefits from the abatement (i.e. social costs from higher pollution) 
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on the change of regulated emission reduction level. In the presence of incomplete 
information regulator simply does not know how much the costs of abatement are 
sensitive on the level of emission reduction.  Generally it is perceived that the cost 
abatement curves are rising with level of abatement. The regulator makes his or her 
best prediction ex ante how such a marginal abatement cost curve may look like; 
however, this marginal abatement cost curve generally differs from the real shape of 
the curve known ex post. According to his or her prediction the regulator chooses the 
level of abatement. The regulator can choose to regulate the level of abatement 
either by price of quantity-based policy instrument. In a nutshell, Weitzman’s point 
was that the better instrument is the one that is more probable to lead to the smaller 
mistakes in the stringency of control imposed. 
 Say it in the words of the economic theory: the different shapes of the marginal 
abatement curves and the curves of marginal social costs from the pollution are what 
matter here. Generally, Weitzman’s outcome was that regulation via prices under the 
conditions of uncertainty is more efficient if the shape of the marginal benefit curve 
(or marginal social cost curve) is relatively flatter compared with the curve of 
marginal costs (i.e. is less sensitive to the not proper choice of level of abatement). 
And vice versa the quantity-based instruments are more efficient in case of relatively 
flatter marginal compliance cost curve compared to the marginal benefit curve of 
compliance or marginal social benefit curve.  We can show it graphically at following 
figures. 
Figure 6 depicts the situation where the marginal abatement costs are relatively 
flatter to the marginal social costs from the increasing level of pollution. On the 
horizontal axis there is the level of the abatement (starting from 100% level of 
abatement and decreasing along the axis towards 0% of abatement). Marginal 
abatement costs fall slowly with the decreasing level of abatement, on the other hand 
marginal social cost (MSC curve) growths rapidly with the increased pollution. 
Regulator assumes that polluters have their marginal abatement cost curve at MACR 
level. Therefore the optimal level of abatement is according to his or her assumptions 
the intersection of MACR with MSC. However, in the reality the real marginal 
abatement curve can have shape also either MACL or MACH. The regulatory issue is to 
choose the instrument that would even with the changed MACL and MACH lead to 
smaller departure from the desired level of pollution abatement. 
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Figure 6 : When the Quantity instrument is better choice 
 
Source: Jacoby and Ellerman (2003) 
If the regulator chooses price as the target of regulation, he or she sets the level of 
environmental tax at MCR (TR) where the assumed marginal abatement curve meets 
MSC. Later it shows that the real abatement costs are related to the higher marginal 
abatement curve MACH.  A new intersection of the chosen level of environmental tax 
with MACH leads to much lower level of abatement (X) and much higher lever of 
social costs.  
On the other hand, if the regulator has chosen the quantity of abatement as a target 
policy instrument, he or she would have set the regulation at TR level of abatement. 
In case of real higher abatement costs represented MACH, the chosen level of 
abatement would have led to slightly higher abatement costs (MCH (TR), however the 
final departure from the desired level would have been much lower. To sum up the 
outcome of Figure 6, the marginal abatement costs are less sensitive to the change 
of level of abatement that the social cost. Therefore it is more efficient to target 
quantity by the policy instruments. 
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Similarly, Figure 7 shows the situation where it is more beneficial to choose the 
price as the policy target followed the same logic as before.  
 
Figure 7 : When the price is better choice 
 
Source: Jacoby and Ellerman (2003) 
 
The marginal social cost are less sensitive to the changes of level of pollution (i.e. 
level of abatement), whereas marginal abatement costs of polluters are much more 
sensitive to the chosen level of abatement. If the regulator chooses TR as a target 
then with actual marginal abatement costs MACH polluters will bear much higher costs 
of abatement MCH (TR). In the same time these costs of abatement are much higher 
than the social costs at same level of abatement. Therefore, the choice of price-
based regulatory instrument would be more efficient in this case. 
2.1.2. Combination of price and quantity 
 
Both in theory and in practice we can see that the price and quantity-based 
instruments are used in combination at the same time. From the environmental 
benefits point of view there is not a clear advocacy for it. If the total demand for the 
emission allowances is greater that the allocation, i.e. the supply, the taxes will only 
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have influence on the distribution of the emission reduction within the system, 
however, will not lead to higher level of emission reduction.  
 
Though, from the point of view of political economy of the environmental regulation 
we can mention several reasons why such a combination can be beneficial. The use 
of tax as a complementary instrument to the emission trading can support the 
stringency of the regulation and function as a penalty for non-compliance or they can 
be used to reduce uncertainty of the compliance costs (to serve as so-called safety 
valves). Another reason can be that the additional taxes might serve to capture 
windfall rents in case of free allocation. 
 
Table 6 : Penalties and permit prices of selected tradable permit systems 
Program Permit price Penalty 
USA – Acid Rain Program 125-225 per ton in 2000 – 2004 2,000 USD per ton26 
(inflation adjustment) 
USA -  Ozone Depleting Substances 
system 
n.a.  25,000 USD per kg 
USA - NOX 2-3,000 USD per tone in 2004 Three allowances for each 
excess ton 
EU ETS Phase    1 :  €0  -  30 
Phase     2:  €20* – 40* 
 (*price prediction) 
Phase 1: €40 + allowance price 
Phase 2: €100+ allowance price 
Source: EPA (see Internet sources), OECD (2006), based on OECD (2003), PointCarbon (see Internet 
Sources) 
 
First point is referring to the deterrent function on excessive polluting activity. In this 
case the tax rate would be designed to be very high to insure that the polluters will 
not dare to emit more emission than what is their actual endowment of emission 
allowances. The cost of monitoring can also influence the height of penalty tax. In 
the emission trading systems where there can be installed a real-time monitoring of 
compliance (e.g. the case of EU ETS and SO2 and NOX trading in the USA), the 
penalty price does not need to be as high because it is highly probable that the non-
compliance will be detected. On the other hand, in case of less efficient monitoring, 
the penalty must be significantly higher to deter from the polluting activity. There is 
a negative correlation between the probability of being caught for the non-
compliance and the optimal level of penalty (OECD, 2006). 
 
                                                 
26 http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-AIR/1997/October/Day-07/a26531.htm (6.3.2008) 
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Second point, taxes can server as price caps for the system in case the non-
compliant pays only the value of the penalty as a final price. In this sense taxes 
reduce the uncertainty for the emitters about the possible maximal cost of 
compliance. In other words, paying penalty instead of reducing the emission can be 
legitimate compliance strategy if the penalty is set sufficiently low.  
 
Another reason why can be used taxes with emission trading combination is the 
possibility of capture the windfall profits in case of free allocation of the emission 
allowances. The example of such windfall profit tax can be the US tax on ozone-
depleting substances that was applied together with the ODS permit trading 
program. This tax is applied to all sold ODS and on any stocks of ODS. According to 
the OECD Tax Database27 the current values ranges between €1.33 and €133 per kg 
depending on their ozone depleting potential. OECD (2006) points out that the 
windfall profit tax is more proper to use in the case when permit relates to 
commercial products such as ODS products and not pollutants per se that are only 
part of the production process, however, not final products as ODS. 
 
In case of EU ETS or Acid Rain program there are no great examples of such wind fall 
tax. Some tendencies can be seen from the media news for example in Spain were 
government intents to push Spain’s utilities to write off €1.2 billion from their balance 
sheets after the government published calculations on how it will hold power 
companies liable for booking windfall profits from emissions trading28. The future 
development of the windfall profit capturing within the EU ETS mainly in the power 
sector will probably follow the way of introduction of greater portion auction of 
allowances in the allocation process rather than introduction of windfall profit tax. For 
example the current version of draft of post 2012 revision of the EU ETS proposes 
100% auction for power sector. We will discuss the post-2012 development of 
regulation in Chapter 3. 
 
2.1.3. Price or quantity – The case of Climate Change 
In general, we can label the pollutants as a stock pollutant or a flow pollutant.  In 
case of the environmental damage, what matters is the total concentration of the 
pollution – i.e. the existing stock, rather then the flow of pollutants. The current flow 
                                                 
27 http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm (10.3.2008) 
28 PointCarbon News 20.11.2007 at www.pointcarbon.com (8.2.2008) 
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contributes to the changes and affects stocks in the future, but in many cases the 
current flow does not contribute directly to current damages. This may be also the 
case of climatic changes and the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. The changes caused by concentration of greenhouse gases today are 
effectively almost the same as tomorrow, therefore the marginal benefit of 
abatement (or marginal cost from pollution) is rather flat as it is shown in Figure 8 
before. In this sense it seemed to be more suitable to regulate it via taxes rather 
than tradable quotas.  
For this argument we also find several supporting findings in academic literature. For 
example Hoel and Karp (2001) summarize the recent developments in the academic 
literature by stating (p.92, ibid) that in almost all the previous literature (i) a steeper 
marginal environmental damage curve, or a flatter marginal abatement cost curve 
favor the use of quotas and (ii) a higher discount factor or a lower decay rate – 
factors which make stocks more important – favor the use of quotas. They compare 
the taxes and quotas in case of application to global warming and the concentration 
of greenhouse gases. They support the finding that also in the case of global 
warming the taxes dominate quotas. They stressed out that the question of 
uncertainty and its modeling makes the right choice of regulation policy very 
important.  Pizer (1999, p. 29) tries to quantify the benefits of both policy 
instruments in case of global warming and  sums up that the expected net gains of a 
harmonized tax are fives times higher29 than even the most favorably designed 
quantity target. Also Nordhaus (2005) summarizes the possible approaches towards 
climate change issues concluding that price-type approaches are likely to be more 
effective and more efficient solution. 
In theory we can see that the choice of some kind of harmonized carbon tax that 
would regulate the greenhouse gases would be probably more efficient solution for 
global warming issues. However, in the real world we see that the global politics 
prefers to regulate it via (tradable) quotas such as in case of EU ETS or Kyoto 
Protocol under UNFCCC.  Why it is so? 
                                                 
29 $337 bn versus $69 at a global level incase of tax. The simulations are based on a global quantity target of 8.5 GtC 
and a carbon tax of $80/ tonne CO2. 
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The evaluation of the choice of either price or quantity instrument but not lays only 
on the comparison of the objective efficiency costs and benefits. In the real 
unperfected world we should at least briefly mention the obstacles hidden in the 
policy decision making process where the different interest groups try to influence 
the policy outcome.  
The implementation of new environmental regulation instrument will trigger 
opposition of the polluters that should be regulated. From the polluters point of view 
the choice of grandfathered emission permits the cost for polluters are not so explicit 
therefore it will be preferred by this interest group. On the other hand the 
implementation of taxes or auctioned permit system will create a possible new 
income for the regulator and politicians in general in case of both taxes and 
auctioned permits that will motivate the regulator to choose this way. These are two 
opposite influences that are present in the decision making process. The final 
outcome has to always be based on agreement among the interest groups – 
therefore it will depend on the relative exertive power of the different groups.  
In case of regulation of business sector we may expect much higher influence on the 
final regulation than in case of regulation of households. This may also be partly a 
reason why the emission trading (mostly grandfathered, i.e. allocated for free at the 
moment) is favored to carbon taxes in practice. This regulation is more supported by 
the industry that is quite well organized in expressing its opinions in comparison with 
the household sector.  
When we are speaking of the implementation of the internationally-based policy 
there is again the same problem with diverse interest and opinions that impede the 
international agreement. The negotiation on the EU-level and the negotiations on a 
global world level may serve as examples. 
 
Within the EU to introduce a new EU-harmonized tax there is a unanimous 
agreement in the EU Council of Ministers needed. There, however, a proposal for EU-
wide CO2 taxation was defeated. The strict rules for unanimity however do not hold 
for implementation of other regulation that is not a tax. Therefore there was no legal 
constrain on the EU to agree on emission trading with qualified majority without 
unanimous consent.  
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What we can see on the functioning of EU ETS is a gradual tendency to tighten the 
allocation rules and to implement higher share of auctioning into the existing 
emission trading system once the industry participants have learned the core 
mechanism of the system. By these gradual changes there are definitively lower 
transaction costs of policy implementation compared to the case of carbon taxes 
where there are explicit costs for the participant imposed from the beginning of the 
regulation and in the same time the system moves slowly to the almost tax-based 
system by growing share of auctioning. According to the current proposal of EU ETS 
revision directive30 there is assumed in the 2012 it should be already more than half 
of the allocation auctioned and by 2020 the whole 100% amount of allocation should 
be auctioned.  
 
2.2. Second-best setting analysis 
The final impact of market based environmental regulation can be significantly 
different from the principal intentions of the regulator. The existence of pre-existing 
taxes and tax exemptions heavily influence the final effect of imposition of carbon 
taxes and/or tradable emission permits. By introduction of taxes or tradable emission 
permits we add a new element into the complex regulatory system. The increase in 
costs of emission intensive production factors will have repercussions speeding up 
the growth of costs in other sectors.  
The second best setting analysis examines the final effects in the general equilibrium 
setting. In the academic literature the core contributors appeared in the mid 1990ties 
represented mainly by several works of Ian W.H. Parry, Wallace E. Oats, A.L. 
Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulder.  
Generally, we can divide the concerns of second-best setting analysis into three main 
topics of adverse effects mentioned in the literature: 
 Primary welfare gains and costs  
 Revenue recycling effect 
 Tax-interaction effect  
                                                 
30 See Internet sources for link to current version of EU ETS Revision Proposal 
 43 
The first effect was in the centre of attention also in the first best (partial equilibrium) 
setting analysis. It compares the welfare gains and costs from the internalization of 
the external costs (so-called externalities) of pollution in the sense of traditional 
Pigouvian approach. The optimal level of the regulation from the point of view of its 
efficiency should be where the marginal social costs equal the marginal social 
benefits. In this situation implementing the environmental tax in the value of the 
marginal social cost of pollution will drive the economy to the Parreto-optimal level. 
In such partial-equilibrium analysis the revenues are normally considered to be 
returned in the lump-sum fashion to the participants. However to compute the total 
efficiency impact we have to compare it with the additional two effects: revenue 
recycling and tax-interaction effect. 
2.2.1. Revenue-recycling and tax-interaction effect 
 
The revenue recycling effect can occurs only in case of revenue-raising regulation 
instruments (taxes or auctioned tradable permits). With the non-revenue raising 
instruments as grandfathered emission permits we can speak only about the indirect 
recycling effect stemming from the higher corporate profit taxes from higher profits 
of firms that received the permits for free and have monetized them.  
 
As the name suggests, the revenues yielded from the environmental taxes or 
auctioned emission permits are “recycled” within the existing tax system via 
reduction of other distortion existing taxes (mainly in the labor market). In academic 
literature the main authors focusing on the benefits stemming from the recycling of 
revenues were for example Pearce (e.g. 1991) or Nordhaus (e.g. 1993). They were 
speaking of the effect of a “double dividend” via curbing emissions and the pre-
existing tax distortions at the same time. Their argument was that by reducing the 
taxes on labor we are decreasing the wedge between the gross wage paid by the 
employer and the net wage received by the employees – therefore increasing the real 
household income that may contribute to the increased level of labor supply and 
labor demand.  
 
However here comes the third effect mentioned in the literature: the tax-interaction 
effect.  Market-based instruments of the environmental regulation try to internalize 
the external costs in the sense of Pigouvian tax. They increase the cost of emission 
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intensive production factors that may lead to the change of the composition of 
consumption by favoring the cleaner goods. These regulatory instruments raise the 
production prices and leads finally to the reduction of the real income of households 
and to decrease of labor supply and demand.   
 
Typically, environmental taxes or tradable permits increase the cost of energy inputs 
of production (i.e. electricity, coal, oil and gas). These increased costs are further 
transmitted to some extend to the final consumers. The degree of passing the 
increased cost to the final consumer depends on the price elasticity of demand of the 
final consumers. Electricity markets are often quoted as environmentally regulated 
markets where the great majority of increased cost of production due to 
environmental regulation can by passed through to the end-users. The reduction of 
the household real wage may lead to the reduction of labor supply by decreasing the 
real value of one working hour compare to its substitutes represented by leisure 
time.  
 
The idea of tax-interaction effect is also align with common optimal (Ramsey) theory 
of taxation. According to the optimal principle the more efficient are broad-based 
taxes compared to narrower ones. The effect of the narrowly focused tax is that it 
pushes people from the taxed activities or goods towards those non-taxes and by this 
distortion of activities or consumption pattern creates an excess burden of the tax 
system. This also seems to be the case of substitution of revenues of labor taxes 
(broader-based ones) by environmental taxes (narrower ones). In the second-best 
setting the optimal tax should show the balance between the social benefits from the 
decreased pollution and social cost that occurs with the excess burden of the tax 
system. 
 
The degree of the tax-interaction effect depends mainly on several features: 
 level of emission abatement required 
 degree of pre-existing tax distortion 
 
Several findings conclude that the efficiency of environmental regulation in a second-
best setting with distortion taxes is usually lower than in a first-best world. For 
example, Goulder et al. (1998) concludes that the occurrence of pre-existing tax 
rates may have a significant influence that may lead to substantial cost increase (35 
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percent or more). They stress on that the impact of pre-existing taxes is particularly 
large for (non-auctioned) emissions quotas, where the cost increase can be even 
several hundred percent.  
 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1994) come with concrete numerical results from running 
both numerical and analytical model on the U.S. data. Their finds are summarized in 
Table 7. Generally, they support the occurrence of the negative tax-interaction effect 
that degreases the optimal level of taxation in comparison with the first and second-
best setting. In some of their scenarios the computed outcome shows that the zero 
rate environmental tax (i.e. no tax) would be the most efficient. 
 
Table 7 : Difference between the Optimal tax rates in the First and Second-Best Settings 
Optimal Tax from Numerical Model 
Realistic Benchmark 
Assumed Marginal 
Environmental 
Damages ($/ton) 
„Optimal“ 
Pigouvian 
Tax in the 
First-best 
setting 
($/ton) 
Optimal Tax 
Implied by 
Analytical Model 
(replacement of 
Personal Income 
Tax) 
($/ton) 
Lump Sum 
Replacement 
($/ton) 
Personal Income 
Tax Replacement 
($/ton) 
Optimized 
Benchmark, 
Personal Income 
Tax Replacement 
($/ton) 
25 25 22 0 7 17 
50 50 45 0 27 41 
75 75 67 13 48 64 
100 100 89 31 68 85 
Source: Bovenberg and Goulder (1994) 
 
2.2.2. Induced innovation effect 
 
Both empirical and theoretical findings confirm that environmental regulation may be 
one of the stimulating motives for the firm's decision to innovate. The regulation can 
act as a demand-push factor that can influence the amount and the direction of the 
innovation. Therefore we are speaking about the induced innovation that follows the 
direction of regulation. The technology response may vary from incremental changes 
represented by the end-of-pipe technology inventions which does not change the 
production process itself or more radical changes, e.g. in form of clean technologies 
that are able to decrease firms cost in the long-run. As far as the different regulation 
instruments are concerned, generally the market-based instruments are supposed to 
be more innovation inducing as they give the operation space to the polluter to 
choose according to his/her needs 
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At this place we can mention several studies that treat the induced innovation effect 
of the environmental regulation both theoretically and empirically. Requate and Unold 
(2003) and later Requate (2005) summarize the latest theoretical approaches in this 
area of research. They confirm the assumptions that market based instruments are 
more efficient that the command and control instruments – if there are placed in the 
market environment with competitive conditions. They critically review the historical 
approaches that tried to evaluate the innovation induced effect of environmental 
regulation by counting the total industry costs before the implementation of the new 
technology and after it. In such a setting the efficiency ranking was (Requate and 
Unold, 2003): 1. Auctioned permits, 2. Taxes and subsidies, 3. Grandfathered 
permits, 4. Emission standards. 
Instead of this, Requate and Unold (2003) and later Requate (2005) focus on the 
individual firms and their decisions to implement a new technology at the point of the 
markets equilibrium. They compare two options concerning the attitude of the 
policymakers. In the first scenario policymakers do not anticipate the technology 
change, however, in the second scenario policymakers set the direction of the 
technological change in the intended direction. They come to the conclusion that in 
case the regulators do not anticipate the direction of the technological innovation 
(which is quite realistic view), taxes may serve as better innovation incentive in the 
long term than tradable permits.  
On the other hand, in the second scenario, the difference in the effect of taxes and 
tradable permits is erased.  The reason why it might be so we have already discussed 
in the previous subsection devoted to first-best setting analysis, if the regulator 
assumes properly the marginal abatement curves of the polluters he or she sets also 
the level of abatement or tax level properly and it does not matter which policy 
instrument is chosen. Interestingly, the authors also did not find the difference in the 
influence on the level of innovation between the auctioned permits and grandfathered 
permits. This sounds reasonable, because firms always count with the price of the 
permits in their investment decisions either as an explicit price they have to pay in 
the auction or an implicit price in form of opportunity costs in case the permits are 
allocated for free. 
What are the findings of the innovation effect of the environmental regulation in the 
empirical works? Here the impact of environmental regulation on technological 
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change can be measured by level of R&D expenditures, adoption of new technologies 
or products by firms or the easiest observable - the number of new patents. 
Indirectly and more tediously it can be measured by the number of firms that have 
exit from the market or by the change of the abatement costs. The very extensive 
summary of the latest empirical findings provide OECD (OECD, 2007) that 
encompassed over 40 individual research papers mainly based on the evidence in the 
USA. The major conclusion of the study is that there is an evidence of the impact of 
environmental policy on the technological change – or at least on the direction of the 
technological change and this holds both for market-based and command-and-control 
regulatory instruments.  
 
The shortcomings of the empirics are a lack of the data and much shorter history of 
the market-based instruments compared to traditional command-and-control 
regulation that does not allow us to say robustly whether the market-based 
instruments outperform the latter one. Studies that try to compare these two 
different types of regulation mainly focus on the US regulation of SO2 via Clear Air 
Act and its implementation of emission trading via Acid Rain Program in the mid 
90ties and secondly on the lead in gasoline phase-down trading in then 80ties. In 
both cases, there can be found studies that are confirming better performance of the 
market-based instruments. For example Burtraw and Palmer (2002) in their analysis 
of implementation of the Clean Air Act conclude that “there is an ample evidence that 
allowance trading has achieved cost saving” and that the program also triggered 
experimentation and innovation through changes in organizational technology and 
organization of markets.” (ibid., p. 25). They show that by the amended regulation of 
the Clean Air Act there were also influenced not only the final suppliers but also the 
intermediate industries (e.g. scrubber manufacturing, coal mining companies or 
railroad transportation) which were competing in finding the low cost compliance 
strategies for the electricity generating industries. This resulted in price fall of low 
sulphur coal by 9% (when the sale of low sulphur coal increased by 28%) and fall of 
the high sulphur coal by 6% (with the 18% decrease of sales) mainly for the 
improved efficiency of the transport and scrubbers. Also Lange and Bellas (2005) 
focusing on the SO2 trading within Acid Rain Program conclude that innovation 
decreased scrubber costs and improved efficiency, however, they point out that the 
decrease in scrubber costs is more probably just once-in-time fall instead on the 
continual process. 
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3. Design of emission trading system – allocation method 
matters 
 
While designing the emission trading system there can be considered several 
determinants of the efficient functioning of the system, as there are choices of proper 
industrial sectors to be covered by the regulation, allocation method to distribute the 
emission allowances and finally setting the proper emission reduction target to create 
enough incentives for the emission reduction. We have chosen only one determinant 
for the deeper both theoretical and practical analysis thanks to the limited scope. 
Another for analysis of the allocation method is the future revision of the biggest 
emission reduction trading scheme: the EU ETS that will be based mainly on the 
revision of the allocation method. 
In this chapter we will pay the attention to possible methods that can be used for 
distributing the emission rights among participants of the system. Emission permits 
can either be given away freely according certain rules (e.g. according to the 
historical levels of emissions or various technical benchmarks) or auctioned off – sold 
to the participants. Both those options have benefits and drawbacks. The volume of 
allocated allowances determines the scarcity of the allowance – their price on the 
market and therefore the total effectiveness of the system. To design the effectively 
working system the basic rule should hold: there have to be allocated less emission 
permits than is the actual level of pollution to create the demand for abatement and 
effective price of the allowances. 
We will first theoretically discuss all those possible options. Special attention will be 
given to the auctioning option of allocation as it is allocation method that is being 
preferred both by the theory and more and more also by the practical usage. Later 
on, we will move towards the analysis of the practical usage of the allocation 
methods in the most important existing system of emission trading: EU ETS. Finally 
we will tackle the topic of future development if EU ETS by summing up the most 
important features of the current version of the EU ETS revision Directive that was 
introduced in January 2008.   
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 The objective of this chapter is to offer the answers to following questions: What are 
the possible methods how to distribute emission permits among the system 
participants? How they are used in the existing emission trading systems? 
3.1. Allocation strategies in theory 
3.1.1. Grandfathering – allocation for free 
Grandfathering represents the allocation method where the allowances are allocated 
for fee. Compared to the second allocation option where participants have to buy 
their emission permits at the auctions, here participants do not have to pay the direct 
costs of permits. The value of permits represents the opportunity costs for them 
(because if they do not use the permits for their compliance, they can sell them on 
the market, the opportunity costs are therefore equal to the price the polluters would 
received on the market). For that reason they incorporate them into the list of their 
variable costs of production. Participants are paying just for the additional permits 
above their level of individual allocation; they buy them on the market.  
The grandfathering creates much more responsibilities for the regulator to design 
transparent and effective rules how to allocate. This seems as a big disadvantage of 
this method: the sensitivity to the political decision of the regulator (and obviously 
related political and lobbing pressure of the participants on the market). In case of 
not well designed rules of allocation via grandfathering, the regulator can create 
distortions to the markets and offer a hidden state aid to the most powerful lobbying 
groups. Grandfathering methods of allocation are always reflecting somehow the 
historical behavior of the participants. Therefore other disadvantage is the necessity 
of transparent reliable data about the historical emissions or production output/ input 
(depending on the concrete allocation method). This creates another burden that the 
regulator has to take on his back. Free allocation accumulates not negligible 
administrative costs that the regulator pays and it is not generating any financial 
revenues that would repay at least part of the cost. Despite, up to present in nearly 
every case of implemented cap-and-trade programs, allowances have been allocated 
without charge to participants. The reason why may by the higher acceptability of 
such a system for the participants   
There exist various ways how to allocate the permits gratis. Generally, there are two 
basic metrics for such allocations:  
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a) Allocation according to the historical emissions of installation 
The regulator chooses the base year of emission and sets the target of emission 
reduction compared to the base year that should be achieved. According to this 
target the regulator later redistributes the emission allowances (each facility would 
get for example allowances amounting the 90% of its emission in the base year). For 
the emission-based allocations, one could consider whether to use “direct” emissions 
(i.e., emissions directly from each installation) or the sum of direct and “indirect” 
emissions, which would include estimated emissions from the electricity and heat 
used at the facility as well. (In reality in the existing programs, we can see the usage 
only of the direct emission as it is practically more feasible) 
b) Allocation according to the benchmarks 
Generally, there are many alternatives for allocation methods that are based on 
benchmarking. We can differ between: Input, output or capacity benchmarks. The 
benchmark can be defined as emissions per unit of input (Typically these inputs of 
energy, but they may refer to other raw materials. e.g. units of coal, lignite, gas) or 
emission per unit of output (e.g. electricity produced). It is also possible to define a 
benchmark related to capacity, often in conjunction with assumed utilization rates. 
The activity (e.g., output, input) used in the benchmark for each installation can be 
determined in various ways either including historical, projected, or continuously 
updated during different allocation periods  
There can be also set various criteria related to the benchmark rate including the 
“best” available technology, the industry average, or some projected level. 
Benchmark rate can be also differentiated for multiple subsectors or other categories 
within a sector. The goal of benchmark in allocation is to increase the transparency 
and distributional fairness of the system because comparable and equal measures 
are implemented to all participants. This seems to be the biggest advantage 
compared to the allocation based simply on the historical emissions of individual 
installations which is favoring those installations with higher historical emissions. 
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In general, benchmarking approaches are combining the site-specific information 
together with standardized measures, The most direct approaches are input- and 
output-based ones that multiply a site’ s process or energy input or its output by an 
emission factor. Annex Table 1 summarizes the 4 types that are based always of 
different combination of site-specific and standardized information. 
The main disadvantage is however the hard task for the regulator how to define such 
benchmarks, how to set the benchmarking rates and how to set the categories where 
the same benchmarking rates would be applied. This again can be a difficult issue for 
the regulator to face the political and lobbying pressure during the process of 
preparing the design of the benchmarks. 
3.1.2. Auctioning – polluters pay 
 
Within the allocation by auctioning, participants have to buy the emission permits by 
bidding on an auction. There are several advantages related to choice of auction as 
an allocation method. The main advantage of using auctioning as an allocation 
method is that there is simply no allocation method needed during the process. The 
regulator only sets the overall allocated volume he/she wants to put into the auction 
and the concrete allocation is done via the market competition during the bidding at 
the auction itself. Therefore it lowers the information burden for regulator and 
overcome the inherent information asymmetry that is rooted within the relationship 
of regulator – polluter. Another advantage is that since there is not needed any time-
consuming negotiation and everything is settled within an act of auction, it is the 
fastest allocation mechanisms. Apart from that there is another not negligible 
advantage for the regulator: the new source of revenues from the auction of permits. 
While speaking about the design of auction suitable for emission permits we should 
focus on various important features of possible auctioning: the format of auctioning 
(one round or multi round) that is also connected with the frequency of auctions 
(once in the allocation period or every year/month), harmonization in case of multi-
country model (one multi national auction or national auctions) and last but not least 
the way of auction revenue recycling (R&D into renewable sources of energy or 
giving back to industries involved in the emission trading). It is also interesting to 
consider how these different options of concrete design of auction affect different 
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participants of the scheme – for example we can look whether the smaller 
participants have the same conditions as the bigger ones under this allocation 
scheme. We should also consider whether there is a secondary functioning market for 
the auctioned permits and how much is the market for allowances concentrated. 
3.1.2.a. Auctioning format 
 
The auction of emission permits is a type of auction where there are sold amounts of 
units of identical and homogenous commodity. Generally, we can speak about two 
kinds of auction: static one-round (sealed-bid) auctions and dynamic two-(or multi-) 
round (open) auction. The main difference between them is that in the multi-round 
auction participants can adjust their bids between the individual rounds of auctioning 
process – they accurate their bids according to new information about the overall 
market and prices received during the previous rounds of the auction.  This is the 
biggest advantage of multi-round auctions, that they reveal more information about 
the emission allowance prices to the system participants during the process of 
auctioning. On the other hand the main advantage of static auction may be its 
simplicity both for the organizer and participants. Annex Table 2 gives the summary 
of various auctioning formats mentioned in the text and/or relevant in the field of 
emission permit auctioning.  
a) Static auction  
There are many different auction forms possible. We can divide them into two basic 
forms: uniform price auction and discriminatory price auction (pay-your-bid 
auctions). In static auctions, the simplest setting is a situation where a seller - 
regulator is offering a fixed supply of identical items and the buyers express their 
willingness to buy various quantities at various price levels by submitting bids at the 
auction. The regulator adds these demand schedules to form an aggregate demand 
curve and to find the market clearing price where the demanded volume of 
allowances is equal to the volume of allowances that the regulator wants to 
distribute. All bids below the clearing price are rejected. All bids equal or greater to 
the clearing price are winning; those at the clearing price have to be rationed. All 
winning bids pay the market clearing price – the price of the last marginal bid. The 
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situation of the uniform price auction is shown graphically in Figure 8. This format of 
auction is also common for the electricity markets31.  
Figure 8 : Aggregated Demand Curve for Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
 
Source: Crampton and Kerr (2002) 
 
This pricing mechanism is efficient in case where no individual bidder is able to 
influence the market price. Because when there are only few participants on the 
market they can strategically influence the prices by bidding artificially low price and 
therefore lowering the final marginal clearing price. This is called shading of bids. To 
use this strategy, a bidder would need to estimate the quantity of all bids of other 
participants of the trading scheme to estimate their chance of influencing the market 
price effectively.  
Regulator can reduce the possibility of artificially low clearing price due to strategic 
behavior of the market participants by introduction of minimal reservation price into 
the auction. In such a situation permits cannot be auctioned bellow the reservation 
price. 
With Discriminatory Price Auction, each winner pays the price of his/ her own bids as 
it is depicted in Figure 9. Each bidder attempts to guess what the clearing price will 
be and then bids slightly above it. Under pay-your-bid format of one round auction, 
                                                 
31 However at power auctions, the price is formed by the marginal bid that is the highest not the lowest one 
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optimal bids are created more according to the best guess of the market clearing 
price, rather than according to the marginal values of individual bidders.  
Figure 9 : Pay-your-bid Auction 
 
Source: Entec and NERA (2005) 
This kind of auction is also sometimes called pay-your-bid pricing. The disadvantage 
of this kind of auction is that it may raise the potential for an economically inefficient 
allocation where the allowances are not allocated to the bidders who would pay the 
higher price for the allowances but rather to those bidders who most precisely 
estimate the clearing price, i.e. those with the best information about the market. In 
this sense such auctioning format may favor the large participants on the market 
because small or inexperienced bidders may perceive it too difficult to predict the 
market clearing price and might be deterred from bidding for fear of making costly 
mistakes. 
While it might at first sight be thought that the pay-your-bid auction would result in 
higher revenues to the seller than the uniform-price auction, bidders will tend to bid 
lower prices in a pay-your-bid auction than in a uniform-price auction so there may 
not be much difference in the total revenue (DTI, 2005). For example Archibald and 
Malvey (1998) even mention that there are some evidence of higher revenues from 
uniform price auctioning e.g. in securities auction markets.  
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It should be stressed that the market participants behave with different pricing 
strategy under each mentioned auctioning format. The incentive to shade the bids 
will be much stronger under the discriminatory pricing. All bidders have the 
opportunity to re-sell the permits on the secondary market for the same re-sale price 
for all the bidders. Therefore the bidders estimate what this price will be and set their 
bids according to it. On the other hand the incentive to shade the price under the 
uniform pricing mode will be only in case the participants think he/she can influence 
the final clearing price. 
Another problem related to the possible concentration of power on the market and 
the possibility to exercise the power is possibility to “short squeeze” the market. This 
term refers to the case where one bidder attempts to corner other players buy 
buying large amount of allowances and later re-sell it at higher prices to those that 
are short. In case the aggregated demand bidding curve is very flat near the clearing 
price, one can win a large share of the market at little additional expense (i.e. by just 
overbidding the last highest price by a small amount).  Cook (2005) pointed out that 
this was a significant problem in US Treasury auctions in the early 1990s, and as a 
result the US Treasury switched from pay-as-bid to uniform pricing in 1998. 
b) Dynamic auction  
Within the dynamic auction market participants have more time to adjust their bids 
according to the information discovered in the earlier auction rounds. Among other 
options there are two basic ways of conducting the dynamic multi-round auctions: 
either as an ascending so-called English auction or a descending (Dutch) auction.  
In an ascending-clock auction price is gradually raised until there is no excess 
demand. The demand schedule approach can be seen as a multiple-round version of 
the sealed-bid auctions. In each round, bidders submit a demand schedule. The 
schedules are aggregated to form the demand curve. The clearing price, where 
demand meets supply, defines the split between winning and losing bids. If this were 
the final round, those bids above the clearing price would be winning, those at the 
clearing price would be rationed, and those below the clearing price would be 
rejected. The process repeats until no bidder is willing to improve (raise) its bids. The 
descending-clock format is reverse process similar to English auction, however, 
starting with the highest prices and repeatedly decreasing the price.   
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For efficient working of the multi-round auction it is important to set the rules to 
minimize strategic behavior. Two things might be considered: First issue is setting 
the proper rules for bidding. For example with English-type auction each bidder’s 
activity in one round predetermines the bidding amount of the subsequent round, i.e. 
the number of units requested in a one round and cannot be raised in subsequent 
rounds. The activity has therefore so-called “lose-it-or-use-it” feature that prevents 
bidders from shading their interest in early rounds.  
The second issue is related to information to be revealed within the single auctioning 
rounds. What exactly should be revealed to the participants? Bidders will see the 
price development during the each stage; however should the regulator also unveil 
something more about the bidding amounts? Burtraw (2007) while summering the 
current real-life experience with this question assumes that the best option is not to 
reveal the total number of allowances requested in each round so that bidders will 
not be able to determine whether unilateral demand reductions on their part will stop 
the clock.  Providing less information will discourage collusion among bidders.  
 
3.1.2.b. Auctioning frequency and multinational harmonization 
 
There are various options how frequent the auctions can be. We can consider the 
extreme case where the allowances are auctioned only once per the allocation period 
or continuous auctioning on yearly/monthly or even daily basis. All the options have 
their pros and cons. 
The election of the frequency format is driven by three main criteria. First, high 
frequency allows most participants to find their bidding volumes close to their actual 
demand. With less frequent auction this balancing of needs is offered more by 
financial intermediaries as they are prepare to bear financial exposure to price risk on 
the open position and via secondary market. Second, with higher frequency auctions 
only a lower volume of allowances enters to the market. Thus, such volume does not 
destabilize the market and offer lower possibility to exercise the market power of the 
large player on the market (even if a market participant could purchase all auctioned 
allowances, he/she could not short-squeeze the secondary market). Third, 
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transaction and administrative costs of auction. With higher frequencies of the 
auction these costs are increasing and reduce the total revenues of the regulator. 
The auctioning frequency influences the liquidity of the whole system. There is a 
natural trade off between the transaction cost on one side related to more frequent 
auctions and the influences on the liquidity of market on the other side related to less 
frequent auctions. To auction all the allowances in one auction could hamper the 
functioning of the system as the huge influx of allowances destabilizes the price 
stability. On the other hand too frequent auctions would generate excessive 
administrative and transaction costs both for the regulator and participants. The key 
features related to this matter are presence of the functioning secondary market 
(e.g. stock exchanges) and the volume of allowances to be auctioned because it 
makes difference whether the allocation method via auctioning is only auxiliary 
allocation instrument (e.g. only a share of total volume is allocated via auction) 32  or 
it is the only means of allocation.  
a) More frequent auction 
As was already mentioned to auction less amount but more frequently has several 
advantages. First, it brings advantages for the regulator. It lowers the uncertainty of 
revenues for the regulator and reduces the possibility that the whole allocation 
amount would be auctioned in the period of low allowance prices. With more frequent 
auctions the relative significance of any auction is reduced, consequently, it reduces 
market and political risks from mistakes during the initial learning phase. 
 Second, it offers better conditions also for the smaller emitters to participate on the 
auction of the system.  With single one-off auction at the start of a trading period it 
would be required large initial investments from companies. Therefore, smaller 
companies would be in a less advantageous position. Another thing is that to 
ascertain that auction participants will pay for their bids; there are common 
requirements for credit or collateral to be posted before the auction. The collateral 
may be either equal to some share of the value of the bid the participant want to 
submit or as a unified fee. The greater the amount of allowances to be auctioned the 
                                                 
32 e.g. as in current EU ETS, there is allowed to auction only certain amount of allowances (5% in Phase 1, 10% in 
Phase 2) and the rest of allowances has to be allocated for free 
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greater the collateral requirements are needed. This may again limit the smaller 
players as their financial position is not so strong.  
Third, more frequent auctions can reduce the negative effect on the price stability. If 
there are frequent auctions, producers can purchase allowances at the time when 
they are selling the product and they hedge themselves against the uncertainties 
created by an open position. In case of longer periods between the auctions financial 
intermediaries substitute the role auction and offer the sales of allocation within the 
periods between individual auctions however they charge the risk premium for 
carrying the risk of an open position. The longer are the periods between the 
auctions, the higher is the risk premium. E.g. Neuhoff (2007) is discussing an impact 
on the frequency on the value of risk premium pointing out that by higher frequency 
the charges for risk premium significantly drop.  
b) Multinational organization of auctions 
While speaking about the international emission trading schemes (such as EU ETS) 
and the possibility of auctioning we should focus on the issues related to framework 
of multinational organization of individual auction: whether to choose either a 
harmonized format of national auctions, single auction for all participating states or 
leave the organization of auction on the national authorities without any 
harmonization. 
In first general question whether to harmonize the national approaches or not there 
is a broad consensus in the academic literature that some kind of  harmonization of 
national auction reduces the transaction costs and stabilize the system and avoid 
distortion (most recently e.g. Ahman et al (2005), Hofmann (2006) Hepburn et al 
(2006) or Neuhoff (2007)). Among the advantages of such harmonization there are 
mentioned the reduction of set-up costs for the national regulators (economies of 
scale), reduction of cost for the players (by avoiding the multiple registration in 
various auctions and acquiring information about them) and last but not least 
harmonized auction would reduce the need for arbitrageurs. 
In case of no harmonization of national auctioning schemes there would be higher 
pressure on the national regulators to favor and protect the domestic industries that 
could result in conflict with the strict state aid legislation (e.g. in the case of EU). 
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There would also occur the problem how to treat the foreign and/or international 
firms –whether to restrict them from some national auctions that would again conflict 
with the state aid rules or to open the auction to all participants. 
In case of harmonization there would be needed co-coordinated action in setting 
harmonizes timetable and setting common reservation price. Without unified price 
floor there would be a competition among the auctioneers to set lower reservation 
price in order to attract more bidders.  
There is not a wide consensus about how often the harmonized auctions should be 
organized. For example Hepburn et al (2006) consider two different possible ways 
how to set up the auction either to follow the format based on the experiences with 
electricity markets (e.g. weekly auctions) or follow the different format based on 
experienced with Treasury bill auctions (less frequent 1 – 3 times a year). 
In case of single auctioning platform common for all participating players there can 
be chosen an independent hosting institution that would run the auction. The 
member states would later share the revenues according the relative size of their 
national allowance allocation. There can be also used already existing exchanges of 
secondary market and sell the allowances directly within their trading schemes.   
 
3.2. Allocation strategies in practice 
 
In general, all the emission trading schemes that we have mentioned in this thesis 
are mainly based on the grandfathering method of allocation with limited amount of 
allowances being auctioned. The explanation for that lays probably in the political 
economy issues mentioned earlier in the text. To implement a completely new 
regulation it is more feasible to start with less stringent way of the regulation – that 
is represented by the allocation for free in case of implementation of emission trading 
schemes – to gain the larger political acceptance of the regulated participants. This 
political acceptance later creates space for introduction of stricter rules in form of 
large share of auctioning within the scheme. This is apparent for example in the EU 
ETS scheme, which will be in centre of our attention in following sub-chapter.  
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Table 8 : Allocation Approaches in existing and proposed emission trading schemes 
Program  Emission 
Covered 
G B A Uses of Revenues 
Existing 
U.S. Acid Rain 
Program 
SO2 yes - 2.8% Recycled to participants in proportion to 
grandfathered allowance allocation (a share of 
which is withheld for auction) 
California RECLAIM SO2, NOX yes yes - - 
U.S: OTC/SIP Call NOX yes yes partly n.a. 
EU ETS Phase 1 CO2 yes yes Max 5%  JI/CDM credits; administration 
costs 
EU ETS Phase 2 CO2 yes yes Max 10%  JI/CDM credits; administration  costs; renewable 
energy; energy efficiency; national fund for 
environmental protection 
Swiss ETS CO2 yes - - - 
Danish ETS CO2 yes - partly - 
Proposed 
EU ETS Phase 3 - CO2  and 
N2O 
partly yes Up to 100% in 2020 Renewable energy; energy efficiency; CCS 
RGGI  (USA) CO2 yes  Min 25%, some 
states up to 100% 
(e.g. New York) 
Energy efficiency and clean energy technology 
USA Federal trading 
schemes proposals 
CO2, GHG yes  partly Various 
Source: Harrison (2007), internet source of Swiss ETS  
Note: G = Grandfathering, B = Benchmarking, A = Auctioning 
 
However, contrary to what was said above, what we can see on the new emission 
trading schemes that will be introduced in the near future is the general movement 
towards allocation via auctioning, and the movement towards compulsory minimal 
level of auctioning. The example of the trading scheme being introduced with 
mandated minimal level of auctioning of 25% is the RGGI - regional trading scheme 
among the 10 U.S. states that will start in 2009. 
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Table 8 gives a summary of allocation method in existing and proposed ETS. In the 
following subchapter we will look closely on the EU ETS scheme and the difference of 
allocation among the member’s states. 
3.2.1. EU ETS  
 
The initial allocation of the trading allowances is very crucial for the functioning of the 
system; therefore before we move to the evaluation of the outcomes of the first 
phase of EU ETS we will discuss the allocation strategies within the EU ETS both for 
the Phase 1 (2005-2007) and partly also for the Phase 2 (2008-2012) and later we 
briefly comment the direction of the prepared changes of the EU ETS revision in 
Phase 3 starting in 2013. 
As was already mentioned before, the implementation of emission trading instead of 
harmonized CO2 tax on the EU level was kind of compromise that allowed to move 
further in the joint EU climate change policy. Nevertheless, the price for reaching this 
compromise was quite high in leaving the multinational scheme highly decentralized 
in the field of national allocation rules. The general rules of allocation design were set 
by EU ETS Directive31, however, when we try to evaluate and compare the individual 
national allocation plans for the first trading period, we encounter almost 27 different 
approaches of allocation. As an extreme example we can mention the National 
Allocation plan of Belgium, where there are in practice three individual sub-allocation 
plans: allocation for the Flemish region, allocation for the Walloon region and 
allocation for the Brussels Capital region. 
The unifying feature is the general method of allocation – allocation for free (via 
either grandfathering or some kind of benchmarking). This way of allocation was 
prescribed by the EU ETS Directive33 allowing only 5% and 10% share of allocation to 
be auctioned in Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively34. Setting those benchmarks and 
allocation among the individual sectors in individual states are both in Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 on the decision of national regulators and their coordination is limited.  
Detailed description of the design of National allocation plans in Phase 1 is given in 
the Annex Table 3. To provide the same level of details also for the Phase 2 was 
impossible as many of the allocation plans are still known only in the national 
                                                 
33 Council Directive 2003/87/ES 
34 .In practice, both in Phase 1 and Phase 2 this maximal limit has not been reached 
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languages without English translation or they have not been officially published yet. 
Now, we highlight the main differences among those national allocation plans in 
Phase 1 and in some cases we compare them with the development in Phase 2. The 
differences lay mainly in: 
a) Definition of the sub-sectors  
The participants of the EU ETS system are installation from the energy intensive 
industries as heat and power generation, refineries, production of cement, paper, 
coke, ceramics and steel. However on the national level we find vast variety of 
national definition of the sub-sectors of these industries that makes the international 
comparison more difficult. The same pattern of decentralization of the national 
allocation was followed also in the preparation of the national allocation plans for the 
Phase 2 that was just finished in the end of 200735.  
We can mention the revised final version of the Czech National allocation plan for the 
Phase 2 that meant a movement towards the simplicity and transparency of the 
allocation. Compared to the Phase 1 where there are 9 sector industries, in the Phase 
2 there is no division between the sectors according to their field of activity, but 
according to their volume of CO2 emissions they emit every year: small installation 
with annual emission less then 50,000 t CO2 and large installation emitting more than 
50,000t CO2 p.a. These two sectors are treated differently – to set their final 
allocation their historic average emissions from 2005 and 2006 are multiplied by 
certain growth factor. This growth factor is more favorable to the smaller 
installation36 than to the larger installation. 
b) Allocation among the years 
National Allocation plans are defined for the whole period, either 3 years (Phase 1) or 
5 years (Phase 2). Then, there is set the annual allocation among the years. The 
majority of the states allocate the same volume every year (e.g. Czech Republic, 
Spain, Germany) or they chose to allocate more in the beginning of the phase and 
                                                 
35 Off course there are delays in the implementation of the National allocation plan. Till the April 2008 there are still 
several states that do not published their installation allocation tables so that we cannot compare all the National 
Allocation Plans for the Phase 2  
36 Growth factor 7% for smaller installation and growth factor1.279% for larger one 
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than less in following years to introduce more stringency into the system (e.g. Italy, 
Denmark, Slovenia) 
c) Usage of auctioning 
The EU ETS Directive37 enables to allocate some share of emission permits via 
auction. In the Phase 1 it was 5%, in the Phase 2 it is 10% of the national allocation. 
In the Phase 1 there was auctioned almost negligible amount of allowances with total 
amount less than 10 Mt CO2 p.a. whose revenues were in majority earmarked to 
cover the administration of the national trading scheme (e.g. in Ireland) except 
Denmark where the revenues were used for JI CDM governmental acquisition. In the 
Phase 2 the auctioned amount of allowances will be significantly higher reaching 
almost 70Mt CO2 p.a. 
The way of the auctioning is not harmonized at the moment. There are states that 
organized the auction via private trading platform (e.g. Hungary in two rounds in 
December 2006 and 200738). Other states organized the auction on their on (e.g. 
Ireland via its Environmental Protection Agency). For the Phase 2, many states still 
have not clarified the way of auctioning; the exception is Germany that has already 
started to regularly auction small volumes on the emission trading exchange already 
in January 2008.  Table 9 summarize the individual volumes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Council Directive 2003/87/ES 
38 via a company Vertis Environmental Finance (PointCarbon News 5.12.2006) 
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Table 9 : Auctioning in the EU ETS 
Phase 1 
volume  
 (Mt CO2) % allocation 
Note 
Denmark 5.025 5% Revenues to purchase emission credits for JI and CDM programs.  
Hungary 2.4 2.5% The Hungarian Ministry of Finance offered the allowance for uniform price 
auction in two rounds: 1st in December 2006 with clearing price €7.42 per 
EUA, and 2nd in March 2007 with clearing price €0.88 per EUA per EUA 
via private trading platform. 
Lithuania 0.5 1.5% Auction organized by private trading platform in September 2007. 
Ireland 0.5 0.75% Sealed Bid Auction Format: Uniform Price Method. 1st round held in 
January 2006 with clearing price of €26.30 EUA, 2nd round in December 
2006 with clearing price €6.87. Auctions organized by Irish Environmental 
Protection Agency 
TOTAL 8.13 0,12%  
Phase 2 
Austria 0.4 1.2% Format of the sale remains unclear. 
Belgium 0.99 0.3% Auction in the Flemish region either in one-run auction or in several times 
during the Phase 2. 
Germany 40 8.8% 2008-2009 Monthly regular sales of allowances via KfW (German bank). 
From 2010 different type of auction planned.  
Hungary 1.32 5% Format of the sale remains unclear. 
Ireland 0.1 0.5% Format of the sale remains unclear. 
Lithuania 0.5 2.7%  Format of the sale remains unclear. 
Netherlands 3.2 4% Format of the sale remains unclear. 
Poland 2 1% Format of the sale remains unclear. 
United 
Kingdom 
17.2 7% First auction should be in September 2008.  Auction solely in the sector of 
Large Electricity Producers  
Total 50* 3%  
Source: European Commission, National Allocation Plans of individual states, Point Carbon News 
Note: *estimation, at the time of writing some of the Member states have not officially published the final 
revised version of National Allocation Plans for Phase 2 
 
d)  “Old” EU-15 member states versus “New” EU-12 ones 
The main difference between the group of EU-15 and EU-12 is in setting the 
reduction targets to achieve by the EU ETS. Generally these targets are determined 
by meeting the reduction obligation set by the Kyoto protocol. As almost all the 
states of EU are Annex 1 countries that have set the reduction targets39 the EU ETS 
us the principal instrument to achieve it. The difference is that the reduction targets 
set by the Kyoto protocol are real only to the EU-15, whereas in majority of the EU-
12 the compulsorily reduction set by the Kyoto protocol individually for each state 
                                                 
39 Except Malta and Cyprus 
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was mainly done by restructuring of the whole industrial sector during the transition 
period40. 
Therefore most of EU-12 regulates the growth but does not set the target for real 
emissions reduction. The general advocacy for this approach is the economic growth 
that is expected and needed in the region of EU-12 to catch up with the living 
standards and economic development of EU-15. This economic growth is to the great 
extent positively correlated with the growth of emission as all the EU-12 countries 
are rather energy intensive economies.  
e) Power sector 
In many allocation plans the power sector is treated differently compared to the rest 
of the sectors involved in the emission trading. The power and heating sector is the 
only sector covered by the EU ETS that does not have to face the drastic international 
competition with overseas competitors from non-emission regulated countries. As the 
power sector operates in the market with very low elasticity of demand to the 
changes of power prices. The increased cost of the emission trading could be 
therefore to the great extent passed-through to the end-users by increase of 
electricity prices. This is the reason why we find in many national allocation plans 
stricter allocation rules for the power sector – mainly in case of the old EU-15 
member states (e.g. Denmark and  UK in Phase 2, Germany in Phase 2). The Annex 
Table 3 gives a summary of individual national approaches towards the power 
sector. 
 
In general, we can divide the allocation approaches for power sector in those that 
rely mainly on the historic emissions or emission prediction based on prediction of 
the energy demand that are later divided by certain reduction factors or those that 
choose the method of benchmarking that sets the benchmarks for individual types of 
fuels. 
 
Example of a strict approach can be the allocation rules of the United Kingdom where 
the allocation rules for power sector are visibly different to the rest of the sectors. 
The UK allocation to individual sectors is set according to the BAU emission scenarios. 
                                                 
40 The exception is Slovenia where there is a real gap between the real emissions and Kyoto target obligation (EEA, 
2007) 
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Power sector has the greatest reduction of 21% between annual emissions in 2003 
and total allocation prediction for 2005-2007. Also in Ireland the growth of the 
emissions from the power sector is strictly limited. The cuts in the Irish allocation 
plan compared to the BAU emission scenario that was used to build up a national 
Allocation are minus 26 %. In Sweden it is a reduction of 20% compared to the 
emission in the base historic year. 
 
The tendency is also visible in comparison between the individual allocation 
approaches in Phase 1 and Phase 2. The example is again the UK, where the whole 
cut in allocation that was done between the Phase 1 and Phase 241 is totally borne by 
power sector and it is more than 25% of the annual allocation of the power sector in 
the Phase 1. Apart from that also the total amount of allocation that should be 
auctioned (7%) is entirely taken from the power sector allocation. 
 
Significant changes between the Phase 1 and the Phase 2 are also noticeable in 
German allocation plan. In the Phase 1 there was no specific rule for the power 
sector, whereas, in the Phase 2 a new benchmarking system for power plants has 
been introduced42. This system is favoring the new built power plants that are in 
operation since 2003 or later and it allocates significantly less to the old plants43.  
3.2.2. EU ETS Revision Post 2012 
 
The first trading period was mainly meant as a learning period the should teach the 
participants how such trading system could work and to prepare both states and 
individual EU ETS participants for active second trading period that is in the same 
time also the compliance period of the Kyoto protocol. 
 
The second period is supposed to set more stringency into the system, however, not 
by changing general design of the system, but by defining only more stringent 
emission caps. On the other hand, a new trading period starting from 2013 is 
assumed to bring not only even more significant emission caps but also significant 
                                                 
41 130 mil EUA compared to almost 100 mil EUA in Phase 2 according to the comparison of the original text of UK 
National allocation plan for Phase 1 and Phase 2  
42 According to the German National Allocation Plan  there are set two best available technology (BAT) benchmarks: 
750 g CO2 /kWh for coal and 365 g CO2 /kWh for gas 
43 with thermal efficiency bellow 41% (lignite), 45% (hard coal) and 55% (gas). 
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changes of the overall functioning of the system introduced by the revision of the 
existing EU ETS Directive. 
 
The official draft of the EU ETS Directive revision was published in the end of January 
200844.  At the moment we do not know the final changes that will be introduced  by 
the EU ETS revision directive as those changes are currently being discussed both on 
the ground of the European Parliament and the European Council under the co-
decision legislative procedure. The ambition of policymakers is to approve the 
directive revisions in the first reading of the European Parliament, i.e. till the spring 
2009 before the European Parliament elections. Nevertheless, generally, we can 
define following main areas that will be changed in the emission trading system in 
post 2012 phase: 
a) Allocation rules 
The allocation rules are the most pronounced topic in the revision process. The 
tendency is to centralize and harmonize the whole allocation process that should be 
in future and mainly to accentuate the auctioning as the general rule of the 
allocation. This revision of the allocation rules is a response for the general critique of 
the highly decentralized process of allocation. And also the response for another 
argumentation focused on the so-called windfall profit gains from the free allocation 
mainly to the power sector. According to the current proposal there should be 
auctioned 100% of the power sector allocation together with auction of 20% shares 
in the remaining sectors already in 2013. The share of auctioning should gradually 
grow to reach the 100% level of all EU ETS allowances in 2020. 
The allocation of the share of allowances to auction will be based both on the historic 
emissions in 2005 and also by the level of GDP of individual states – so that countries 
with GDP per capita lower than the 120% of the EU average will receive relatively 
more allowances for auction. If we assume that currently there is less than 10% of 
allowances auctioned, this means a huge change to the whole system. It will also 
mean a huge amount of financial recourses to be managed by the regulator. It is 
assumed that the auction revenues will belong to the national state not to the EU 
itself as a main emission market regulator. According to the current legislative 
                                                 
44 see in Internet sources the web page with the official EU ETS revision proposal 
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version at least 20% of the auction revenues should be earmarked for the combating 
the climate change and promotion of the renewable sources of energy. 
b) Period duration 
Phase 1 was established for 3 years, Phase 2 will mean an allocation for next 5 year. 
The revision of the post-2012 development will again enlarge the allocation period to 
8 years. The longer the allocation period the more stable the system is and it creates 
better incentives for abatement activities in a larger scale.  
In the short term, the ways of abatement and emission reduction are more 
constrained. In case of the EU ETS setting the short-term possibility lays mainly in 
the power sector – namely in the fuel switching from coal-to-gas among existing 
power plants, i.e. dispatching the coal-based power plants by gas-based ones. 
Though, the possibilities are limited by existing generation portfolio. The reduction 
potential is significantly larger if there are stable conditions for investment in the 
longer term – e.g. by building new clean sources or replacing out-of-day technologies 
by the BAT options.  
This longer-term perspective is already given in the Phase 2 thanks to the banking of 
allowances between Phase 2 and Phase 3. This rule is already incorporated in the 
existing EU ETS Directive. As a result, we can see the Phase 2 and Phase 3 till 2020 
as one continuous period. This already starts to match with the investment cycle and 
it may presumably help to bring the desired regulation outcome: shift towards 
cleaner technologies. 
c) EU ETS coverage 
The EU ETS coverage in post-2012 will change in three areas: (i) in the sector scope, 
(ii) in the definition of the minimal size of participants and finally (iii) in the 
greenhouse gases coverage. Since the beginning of the Phase 3, there will be added 
new sectors of aluminum producers and chemical industry.  The EU ETS coverage will 
be enlarge by the inclusion of other greenhouse gases as nitrous oxide45 and 
perfluorocarbons46. It is estimated by the EU ETS revision directive that adding these 
                                                 
45 The greenhouse gas that is apparent mainly in the production of fertilizers. 
46 Aluminum production 
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new gases and related sectors the EU ETS coverage can grow by around 6-7% (150 
Mt CO2) compared to the level of allocation in Phase 2. 
 
Apart from the EU ETS revision there are also discussed independently other sectors 
in separate legislative proposals: aviation that will probably to the EU ETS be added 
in 2011 or 2012 which is already in the second reading of the European Parliament 
and currently also maritime shipping that is however in less mature stage of political 
debate. 
 
The EU ETS revision also counts with the provision of the possibility of opt-out of 
smallest emitters provided that there is an equivalent emission reduction measures 
for those small emitters. The opt-out clause tackles the frequently criticized issue of 
the efficient functioning of the emission trading for the very small polluters that have 
to bear high administrative cost for participating in the system47. The EU ETS 
Revision directive is mentioning the 10,000 t CO2 p.a. as a threshold. 
 
As it is summarized in Table 10 by setting the threshold value at 10,000 we would 
reduce the total number of installations by more then 4,000, however, the total 
emission would be reduced by less than 1%.  In the table we can also see the high 
degree of concentration of the emission among the small number of large 
installation. Therefore by reducing dramatically the number of installation the overall 
target emission under regulation would not be changed however the overall 
regulative burden related to the amount of participants would be reduced 
significantly. 
 
 
Table 10 : Concentration of the allowance allocation  
 Verified emissions CO2 in 2005 (Mt) <10,000 <20,000 <25,000 >1,000,000 
Number of small installations 
(share of total number of installation) 
4164 
(cca 35%) 
5792 
(cca 50%) 
6311 
(cca 60%) 
431 
(cca 4%) 
Total emissions of small installation in 2005 (Mt) 
(Share no total emissions) 
14.8  
(<1%) 
38.3 
(<2%) 
49.9 
(<3%) 
1,387.8 
(cca 65%) 
Source: Author’s own computation according to the CITL data (see Internet Sources) 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 due the mainly CO2 monitoring and annual verification 
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d) Link to international emission trading schemes 
At the moment the EU ETS is indirectly linked to the global emission trading scheme 
established by the Kyoto Protocol via the JI and CDM emission reduction projects. 
The revision proposal offers the scenarios of the future development and provides the 
targets to be reached as well: (i) the scenario where there is no future international 
cooperation and (ii) the scenario where there is an international agreement reached 
after the 2012 Kyoto protocol scheme.  
 
In the first case the total emission reduction to be reached by the EU ET is 21% 
compared to the level in 2005 that goes in line with the overall EU reduction target of 
20% compared to the level in 1990. In the latter the scenario the target is adjusted 
to the emission reduction 30% compared to the 1990 on the whole EU level, 
however, the concrete reduction target for the EU ETS is not defined.  
 
The revision of the EU ETS Directive provides with the possibilities to link the 
compulsory national or sub national trading schemes provided there is an agreement 
between the EU and the state with the compulsory trading scheme.  
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4. Analysis of EU ETS in Phase 1 and Phase 2 
 
The last chapter is meant as the practical analysis of the short-term results of the 
policy in the EU related to the climate change where the main instrument used on the 
EU level is the emission trading scheme – the EU ETS. In Chapter 2 we were 
discussing why this instrument can be preferred. In Chapter 3 we tackled the design 
of the EU ETS concerning the design of allocation. In this chapter we finally look on 
the real results of the implementation of EU ETS in Phase 1 and what we can expects 
for the coming Phase 2. 
 
We first look on the comparison of allocation and real verified emissions in Phase 1 
analysis both on the country and sector level. Afterwards, we try to use these data of 
the past development to look into the future Phase 2. 
 
We try to answer questions as: Which states and sectors were short of allocation in 
Phase 1? What are the factors influencing the possible deficit or over allocation? Will 
it be the same in the Phase 2? 
4.1. Results of EU ETS Phase 1 - Learning Phase  
 
To evaluate the Phase 1 of EU ETS we can do it from many starting points according 
to the main purposes of the emission trading system. The purpose of Phase 1 was to: 
(i) establish the emission trading market with (ii) clear CO2 price signals and to (iii) 
trigger the abatement activities in the cost effective way. Therefore our indicators of 
evaluation can be: (i) emission market value and the liquidity of the market, (ii) price 
of CO2 expressed by EUA prices and finally (iii) the comparison of the allocation 
versus real emission during 2005 – 2007. 
 
Before going into the details, we can sum up the main results. The most successful 
was the EU ETS in establishing the real and liquid carbon emission market. However, 
already less successful was in fulfilling the remaining criteria thanks to the general 
over-allocation. Nevertheless, as we will see in the next subchapter focusing on the 
outlook of Phase 2, the reduced allocation for the following trading periods in Phase 2 
and subsequently in Phase 3 can correct the functioning of EU ETS. 
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a) Market liquidity  
 
EU ETS is covering nearly 11 thousand installation representing almost 5 thousand 
companies – the biggest emission market ever established. This creates sufficient 
condition for establishing a liquid market with multiple participants. The emission 
market liquidity can be measured by the volume of trade both on the specialized 
emission trading exchanges48 and by the volume of bilateral OTC trades.  
 
Generally we can see a dynamic growth on both segments of the market with 
majority of trades happened on the OTC market. EUA has been started bilaterally 
already in the end of 2004, on the emission exchanges in February 2005. Whereas, 
in the first year of Phase 1 the total volume reached almost 269 Mt C02 traded, in 
2007 it was already more than 5 times more almost 1,500 Mt C0249.  
 
b) Price of CO2 
 
Prices of CO2 expressed by prices of EUA have experienced large volatility during the 
Phase 1 reaching almost €30 in the beginning of the Phase and later gradually falling 
to 0. On the graph of EUA prices development in Annex Figure 4 we can see the 
sensitivity of prices of the chosen level of cap. The release of the first verified 
emission data of 2005 in April 2006 gave a strong signal to the market participants 
about the balance between the allocation and emission that trigger a significant fall of 
prices. 
 
The development of prices of CO2 was reflecting the main drawback of the EU ETS in 
Phase 1: insufficiently binding reduction targets that created over-allocation. The 
reason for the over-allocation can be the combination of both limited quality of 
historic emission data and the influence of national and industrial interest to set the 
emission caps sufficiently high. However, we should have in mind that the Phase 1 
was meant as a learning period to implement smoothly the regulation. This goal was 
reached.  
 
Thanks to the abolished banking of emission allowances between the Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 the over-allocation experienced in the Phase 1 that drove the EUA prices 
                                                 
48 for EUAs the 3 most important European Emission Exchanges are European Climate Exchange (ECX ) in the UK, 
Nordpool in Norway, European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Germany 
49according to PointCarbon – see Internet sources 
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towards 0 will not influence the prices and price signals in Phase 2 and beyond. On 
the other for the giving more stability to the market there is already allowed the 
banking between Phase 2 and Phase 3 showing more than educational ambitions of 
the Phase 2 and beyond. 
 
c) Allocation versus emissions 
 
The end of April 2008 was the official end of trading with the allowances from Phase 
1 of the EU ETS. During April 2008 there were also published in the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL50) the verified data for the emission in 2007. We 
still do not have the 100% of all 2007 data in hand, however, we can already analyze 
more than 95% of all installation covered. For our analysis we can use all 25 states 
that were participants from 2005 comparing whole allocation for 3 years 2005 – 2007 
to the emissions for the same period. Romania and Bulgaria became the EU ETS 
participants in 2007, however, we still do not have the verified data complete of 
Romania and currently we do not have any data for Bulgaria.  
 
CITL data shows a slight growth of CO2 emissions over the 3-year period time 
showing a total over allocation of around 200-250 Mt CO251 (in the whole 3 year 
period). When we look on the country level, the only countries with the real short 
allocation were the UK, Italy Spain, Greece and Slovenia. On the other hand the 
countries with the biggest allocation surplus were Poland, France and Germany. The 
detailed numbers are showed in Annex Figure 1. 
 
From the sector allocation point of view, we have divided the allocation into 5 sectors 
to compare the sector allocation (power and heat, paper production, production of 
metal, production of ceramics, glass and cement, production of oil in refineries) 
Sector of power and heat generation was the only sector with allocation deficit 
(around 150 Mt over 3 years). On the other hand, the sector with the most abundant 
allocation was metal production. Comparison of individual sector deficit and over-
allocation are depicted in Annex Figure 2. The detailed numbers related to the 
deficit allocation in power and heat sector according to the location are showed in 
Annex Figure 3.  
                                                 
50 See Internet Sources 
51 the upper bound is estimation for complete data as at the moment there are still mission some installations in 
Romania, whole allocation and emissions for Bulgaria and some individual installation among EU 25 
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4.2. Phase 2 and beyond – Will there be real deficit? 
 
In 2008 Phase 2 of EU ETS has already started. In this section we will first 
summarize the possible factors that influence the future development of prices of 
allowances. Subsequently, we try to look if there will be a real deficit by using data of 
the future economic and emission intensity development and allocation for Phase 2.  
4.2.1. Factors influencing the development of Phase 2 
 
When we are speaking about the future development of Phase 2 we have to look both 
on the side of demand for emission allowances and supply of emission allowances 
and emission reductions. The linking instrument of these two sides is the price of 
emission allowance that gives clear signals to all market participants. In this sense, 
to understand the future development of the Phase 2 we need also to understand 
what influence the price of emission allowance itself. 
  
Table 11 : Factors influencing the EUA Demand and Supply  
 Demand for EUA Supply of EUA and other emission 
reductions 
Factors of regulation and policy o EUA installation allocation 
o Other emission reduction related 
regulation (SOX, NOX  regulation, 
renewable energy obligation) 
o Emission reduction target 
o International Agreements 
o Future International Agreements 
o EUA installation allocation 
Market-based factors o Macroeconomic Growth 
o Emission Growth – Carbon intensity 
growth 
o Prices of energy commodities (oil, 
gas, coal, electricity) 
o Development of the market with 
emission reduction – i.e. JI and CDM 
projects 
Other Factors o Weather-related factors o Weather-related factors 
Source: Author’s comparison 
 
Generally, we can divide the factors influencing both sides on either factors related to 
the policy and regulation, market-based factors or other factors.  Table 11 gives the 
summary of the main possible factors. 
 
The demand side is represented by the compliance participants of the EU ETS 
accompanied by the financial institutions that participate in the emission trading for 
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speculative purposes. The supply side is represented by the regulator allocating the 
allowances and by the suppliers of other emission reduction credits represented by 
the flexible mechanism of the Kyoto protocol – JI and CDM projects that can be to 
some extend also utilized within the EU ETS and possibly also by the participants of 
the EU ETS willing to sell the allowances. 
 
The starting point is the size of the gap between the allocation of emission 
allowances and emitted emissions for individual installations. The price of the EUA is 
determined by the gap size and also by the cost of abatement options that are 
available to reduce the gap. There are factors that increase the gap by driving the 
emissions up, e.g. the macroeconomic growth or weather conditions. On the other 
hand, slowdown in economic growth rates that is currently apparent across the USA 
and Western Europe could result in a reduction in economic activity in the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS regulation and by lowering the demand for EUA. 
 
Other factors that influence both the size of the gap and indirectly the EUA prices are 
the internal abatement of EU ETS participants and price of the abatement. In the 
short-term the abatement can be done only through the optimization of the existing 
technologies and optimization consumption of energy sources by these existing 
technologies. The direction of the abatement options is also determined and very 
limited by prices of energy sources, namely oil, gas, coal and electricity. 
 
For example we can look on the impact of prices of oil on the level of and price of 
abatement options. Prices of oil and natural gas are closely linked thanks to the gas 
indexation to oil prices. Using gas instead of coal for energy production is a way of 
abatement that reduces the CO2 emissions. This means that power plants based on 
coal are substituted by the gas-based installation that have been already operating 
but not with 100% utilization of their production capacity. This is called a power plant 
dispatching or fuel switching. In the current energy portfolio mix in Europe the option 
for this fuel switch is rather limited and available only in the Great Britain and partly 
also in the countries of Benelux where there is similar share of gas and coal based 
power plants (EGL, 2007). However with present oil prices upsurge, the gas prices 
are also driven up which distract the option of switching from coal-based production 
to gas-based one and contrary to this it shifts the European electricity mix away from 
low-carbon natural gas generation towards higher-carbon coal generation. 
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Consequently, as emissions rise, coal generators have to buy more emissions 
allowances, which drives up the price of allowances as well. 
 
The goal of the market-based environmental regulation is to trigger the abatement 
where it is the cheapest to do so. Therefore another way of abatement with the EU 
ETS apart from the internal abatement is to invest into the abatement where it is less 
costly to do so, i.e. in the developing world. The option is represented by the 
emission reduction credits under the Kyoto protocol flexible mechanism introduced in 
the Chapter 1. These credits from JI and CDM projects can be to some extent used as 
an equivalent to the EUAs. 
 
Each state could define in the National Allocation Plan the level of flexible 
mechanisms represented by the CDM and JI projects that can be used as additionally 
to the EUA use. Generally, this limit is stated as a share of the individual installation 
allocation. The average import limit for EU ETS is around 13%. The maximum 
amount that can be used within the EU ETS is around 1400 Mt CO2e in 5 years of 
Phase 2. The factual use of these credits depends however on the real supply of 
those credits. At the moment only very small part of the expected amount of 
emission reduction credits, (so-called CERs52) amounting to around 15O Mt CO2e53 
has been already issued. The rest of the projects are remaining in the less developed 
stage. The expected volume that will be generated till 2012 is around 1,4000-2,200 
Mt (Capoor, 2008).  
 
The supply of EUA and emission reduction is in the long term influenced mainly by 
the policy and regulation factors. European Union is consistently showing its 
ambitions to become a leader in the field of combating the climate change and to 
establish a stringent emission reduction regulation. In 2007 EC published its targets 
toward the 2020 represented by the 20% CO2 emission reduction compared to 1990, 
20% share of renewables in the final energy consumption and 20% increase of 
energy efficiency. These targets were later presented in the directive proposals 
officially released in January 200854. This sends a bullish signal on expectation about 
                                                 
52 CER stands for certified emission reduction 
53 According to UNFCCC body dedicated to the issuance of CER, i.e. UNFCCC CDM Executive Board. See the 
Internet Sources 
54 See Internet Sources – EU ETS Phase 3 Draft Proposal 
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the emission reduction targets. As the future allocation of allowances will have to be 
in line with the political targets.  
4.2.2. Model Data 
As we have mentioned in the previous subsection. Phase 1 terminated with the 
overall allocation surplus, even thought on the country and sector level we have seen 
some gross deficits in the allocation. Now we would like to look if the Phase 2 will be 
also over-allocated or not. 
To make a simplified prediction about the emission development we have applied the 
methodology used by European Commission that was mentioned in the European 
Commission Decisions over National Allocation Plans for Phase 255. Generally this 
approach combines the predictions about the future economic development 
expressed by GDP growth and emission intensity of the individual economies 
expressed by the volume of C02 emitted on unit of GDP.  
In the European Commission decision there were used data from the prediction made 
in autumn 2006 (DG ECFIN, 2006) related to the short-term prediction of GDP 
growth and data from the PRIMES model56 of growth trends up to 2030 from 2005 
(DG TREN, 2005) related to the long-term economic growth forecast and forecast 
about the emission intensity development. We have updated the prediction using the 
latest data of economic forecast from spring 2008 (DG ECFIN, 2008) and updated 
version of growth trends up to 2030 from autumn 2007 (DG TREN, 2007) that are 
better reflecting the current development provided the current change and slowdown 
of the economic growth in the global developed world. Compared to the previous 
version from 2005 (DG TREN, 2005) the estimation about the economic growth has 
been downgraded from 2.5% to 2.2 in decade 2000-2010. 
We build up to scenarios where there is reflected different rate of carbon intensity 
development and we compare them with the allocation for Phase 2 on the country 
level:  
                                                 
55 See European Commission Decisions on NAP in Internet sources 
56 The PRIMES model simulates the European energy system and markets on a country-by-country basis and provides 
detailed results about energy balances, CO2 emissions, investment, energy technology penetration, prices and costs 
at 5-year intervals over a time period from 2000 to 2030. 
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o Scenario I. with conservative assumptions of future possible reduction of 
carbon intensity that use PRIMES model forecast outcomes about the carbon 
intensity development 
 
o Scenario II. with ambitious additional developments of reduction of carbon 
intensity than it is predicted by PRIMES model. Using 3% of the carbon 
emission intensity in period 2005-2010 and than reduction of 6% in period 
2010-2015 and other 6% 2015-2020. The rationale for the enhanced carbon 
intensity reduction is that in the long-term the reduction can by achieved due 
to the ambitious EU targets promoting the energy efficiency, use of renewables 
and strict reduction of air pollutants (e.g. SOX, NOX regulation by LCP 
Directive57) 
 
We do our analysis in two steps – in the first step we are looking on the prediction of 
only Phase 2 and in the second step extending our prediction for Phase 3 till 2020. 
We are using economic data released by the European Commission for years 2007-
2011. For years 2007-2009 we can apply the short-term forecast of the European 
Commission published in spring 2008 (DG ECFIN, 2008). For subsequent years 2010-
2020 we use long-term prediction published by European Commission based on the 
updated outcomes of PRIMES model released in autumn 2007 (DG TREN, 2007).  
 
Apart from the data about the economic development there are used data reflecting 
the CO2 emissions. As a starting point there are used the average verified emission 
data in EU ETS Phase 1 2005-2007 taken from the CITL58. In later years there are 
applied the emission intensity forecasts on the country level mentioned in the 
European Commission long-term prediction. Detailed input data are in Annex Tables 
4-6. 
At the moment we already know some preliminary information about the further 
development after the termination of Phase 2. According the directive proposals the 
overall EU ETS emissions should be cut by 21% compared to historic level in 2005.  
In comparison to this, the reduction target for the Phase 2 compared to the 1990 
                                                 
57 2001/80/EC  
58 See Internet Sources 
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historic emissions is 6.5%59. The reduction in Phase 3 should be reached by gradual 
cutting of the total allowance cap by 1.74% each year starting from 2013 to reach 
1,720 Mt of CO2 in 2020. As a starting point for the application will be the 2010 of 
the period of the Phase 2. The graphical illustration of the continual decrease of the 
allocation in Phase 2 and 3 is depicted in Figure 10 together with the presentation of 
our prediction. Before doing so we briefly tackle several parameters that influence 
the final level of allocation for the operating installation. In the results we present 
also a sensitivity analysis to these factors. 
To arrive to the concrete numbers of the expected deficit or over-allocation we 
should have in mind several parameters that either increase or decrease the real 
allocation. First, it is an allocation that has to be set aside for the new installations 
that start to operate in the related trading Phase. On average, we should count for 5-
6% of total allocation that is in so-called New Entrants Reserve (NER) and it is not 
directly allocated to the system. NER allocation therefore reduces the real allocation 
for the existing installation. 
Second, it is the limit applied for the possible import of emission reduction credits 
from JI or CDM projects. This limit increases the real allocation for the installation. 
This JI CDM import limit is country specific with concrete JI CDM limits showed in 
Annex Table 6. On the EU level it represents around 13% of the annual allocation 
(around 280 Mt p.a. or in total around 1.400 Mt in five years of Phase 2). This limit 
holds for the whole allocation period in Phase 2 however according the current 
version of the EU ETS revision its use will be restricted in Phase 3 so that the total 
import limit will be 1.400 Mt in 13 years instead of only 5 years. In our analysis we 
assume that the whole limit will be utilized between the years 2008-2012.  
Table 12 summarize the main important inputs for our analysis – there are reported 
the EU-27 average numbers; however, for our analysis we have used the data on the 
national level showed in the Annex Tables 4-6. 
 
 
                                                 
59 According the EU ETS Directive Revision – see Internet Sources 
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Table 12 : Main inputs for our analysis 
Emission – Allocation inputs Economic Inputs CO2 Emission Intensity inputs 
Mt CO2 p.a. % % 
Adjusted 2005 Verified emissions 222860 Average EU-27 GDP growth 
2007-2011 
2.2 Average EU-27 emission 
reduction 2005-2010 
-2,7 
Average Allocation in Phase 2 p.a. 2083 Average EU-27 GDP growth 
2012-2020 
2.4 Average EU-27  emission 
reduction 2010-2015 
-2,5 
JI and CDM import limit  p.a.   278 Average EU-27  emission 
reduction 2015-20 
-2,5 
Phase 2 Cap adjusted – without  
NER 
1958 Additional emission factor 
reduction applied in Scenario 
2 for 2005-2010 
-3 
Final Phase 2 Cap adjusted – 
without NER with JI CDM imports 
2236 
Average Allocation in Phase 3 1847 
Predicted Allocation in 2020 1720 
 
Advanced emission factor 
reduction applied in Scenario 
2 for 2010-2015  and 2015-
2020 
-6 
Source: various sources – see description in Annex Tables 4 - 6 
 
4.2.3. Results 
According to our analysis we can conclude using the input for Scenario I. (our BAU 
scenario) that both in Phase 2 and Phase 3 the installation will be short of allowances 
and therefore there will be a real need for internal abatement in Phase 2 around 230 
– 250 Mt CO2 p.a. with full utilization of possible imports of emission credits from JI 
CDM projects and with allocation reduced by the New Entrants Reserves. Due to the 
reduced allocation the situation of over-allocation in Phase 1 will not be repeated. 
In Phase 3 the allocation deficit will be even greater under current prediction of 
economic growth and emission intensity (BAU Scenario I.) reaching to 750 Mt CO2 
p.a. Thanks to the facts that allowances from Phase 2 can be banked into Phase 3 we 
can see Phase 2 and Phase 3 as one continuous period with average deficit ranging 
                                                 
60 including an approximation of the emissions in 2005 of the installations that where not covered in the ETS in the 
first trading period but are covered in the second trading period  according to EC Press Releases – see Internet 
Sources   
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500 Mt CO2 p.a. giving the bullish long-term signals of the growing demand for 
allowance and consequently bullish signals for the price development. 
As was described before the level of the gap between the allocation and emission will 
have to be covered by internal abatement and the price of internal abatement will be 
reflected in the prices of allowances. The arms-length way of abatement is a fuel 
switching among the existing coal and gas power plants in those countries where 
such switching is available (mainly in the UK and countries of Benelux). As a result 
the prices of fuel costs – mainly the oil, gas and coal are expected to be the main 
determinants of the allowance prices over the Phase 2 and beyond (Capoor, 2008).  
If we presume that the emission intensity will be reduced faster and to the greater 
extend that is assumed under the BAU development in Scenario I. we can apply our 
Scenario II.  By application of additional measures to reduce the GHG emissions we 
expect the emissions can additionally decrease by 200 Mt. The possible allocation 
average deficit can be in longer-term in Phase 2 and Phase 3 together reduced to 354 
Mt CO2 p.a. The detailed results are compared in Table 13. 
Table 13 : Comparison of scenarios 
 Mt CO2 p.a. Scenario I. Scenario II. 
Total emissions p.a. 2488 2422 
Total allocation p.a. - Phase 2 2083 2083 
Gross deficit 405 339 
NER reserves 125 125 
JI CDM Import 278 278 
PH
AS
E 
2 
Net Deficit (- JICDM + NER) 252 186 
Total average emissions p.a. 2503 2293 
Total allocation p.a. - average 1847 1847 
PH
AS
E 
3 
Average Deficit 759 459 
PHASE 2+3 Average Deficit 564 354 
Source: Author’s computation according to the inputs – see Annex Tables 4 -6 
We can also look on the sensitivity of emission allocation gap on the changes of 
economic growth. If we increase our prediction of the economic growth by 0.5% in 
every period the average deficit over the whole period would change by more then 
60 Mt p.a. to nearly 640 Mt in Scenario I. and 420 Mt in Scenario II. 
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Figure 10 : Scenario I. – Allocation Deficit in Phase 1 and Phase 2 
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Source: Author’s computations according to the input data – see Annex Tables 4 - 6 
Figure 10 gives the graphical result for Scenario I. and compares it with Scenario II. 
The total allocation is compound area of allocation for existing installation (grey area) 
and the set-a-side allocation for the new installations that may start to operate in 
Phase 2 and 3 (white-grey striped area). The deficit in Phase 2 and Phase 3 is also 
compound area. The overall deficit is made of the gross deficit without the utilization 
of credits from JI CDM programs (yellow-black striped area) and net deficit (yellow 
area) that represents the real deficit that the installations will face within the EU ETS. 
The purple area shows how the deficit would be reduced under Scenario II. 
To sum up, with current prediction about the economic growth and development of 
emission reduction the outlook to Phase 2 and Phase 3 predicts a significant deficit 
that will have to be covered by enhanced internal abatement of the EU ETS 
participants. 
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Summary 
 
The emission trading is an example of a market-oriented environmental regulation 
that has been in the centre of interest both of academic society and politicians over 
the last several decades. It has been already implemented in various cases with 
focus on reduction of diverse kinds of pollution and emissions. One of the last 
examples of a practical implementation of emission trading is the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions – namely the European Union Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS).  
 
We have chosen the EU ETS for deeper evaluation for several reasons. The EU ETS is 
the biggest ETS ever implemented encompassing almost 11 thousand of individual 
installations and nearly 50% of GHG emission of the EU. It is a long-term policy tool 
that will probably influence the European and presumably also the global policy for 
another more than decade. The Phase 1 (2005-2007) of the EU ETS has already 
finished giving the possibility to evaluate the outcomes and the overall design of the 
system. In the same time allocation for Phase 2 (2008-2012) has been already 
known and the general outline of Phase 3 (2012-2020) has been also announced that 
enable us to roughly estimate the possible further development. 
 
We have tackled different issues related to the implementation and efficiency of the 
emission trading system. In the theoretical part we have questioned whether it is 
better to regulate emission via price-based instruments or via quantity-based 
instruments such as emission trading. We have concluded that even though the 
price-based instruments are by theory more favored in issues related to the 
regulation of GHG emissions, emission trading system is politically more feasible to 
implement both on the national level and even more in the international field of 
negotiation. 
 
The crucial issue of each emission trading system is the way of allocation of emission 
allowances. We have described the two main methods of allocation: grandfathering 
(allocation for free) and auctioning both theoretically and practically on the examples 
of existing ETS. The majority of existing ETS is based on free allocation to the 
participants reflecting the historical emission in some cases with combination with 
general technology benchmarks. However, the future development of the EU ETS and 
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other planned ETS reveals the general movement towards greater utilization of 
auctioning.  
 
The allocation methodology during the Phase 1 of the EU ETS shows high degree of 
heterogeneity among the member states and among the sectors even though all 
states have allocated majority of allowances for free. In some countries of EU-15 
(e.g. UK, Sweden, Denmark) there is noticeable more stringent approach towards 
power sector compared to the rest of sectors. Among the EU-12, generally, the 
allocation allows for moderate emission growth that is predicted due to the enhanced 
economic growth.   
 
The purpose of Phase 1 of the EU ETS was to establish a functioning emission 
market. From this point of view the EU ETS was a great success. The EU ETS was 
less successful in triggering the real reduction of GHG emissions. Generally, Phase 1 
terminated with not negligible over-allocation. The only countries with short 
allocation were the UK, Italy Spain, Greece and Slovenia. On the other hand the 
countries with the biggest allocation surplus were Poland, France and Germany. Only 
the sector of power and heat generation finished with gross allocation 
deficit..........................................................................................   
 
Our outlook to Phase 2 and beyond shows that the failure of over-allocation should 
not be repeated in Phase 2 and beyond. On the contrary, significant deficit between 
the allocation and real emission may be expected. There are several reasons for it. 
Allowances can be banked between the subsequent periods that provide the 
participants with long-term stable conditions. Allocation is further cut both in Phase 2 
and more significantly in Phase 3 to reach goal of 21% EU ETS emission reduction 
target compared to 2005. The proposed revision of the architecture of EU ETS is 
movement towards more harmonized thus transparent and efficient regulatory 
instrument.........................................                                                    ...          
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Annexes 
Annex Table 1 : Summary of possible benchmarking approaches 
 
Type Name of 
Benchmarking 
method 
Output Benchmark emission 
factor 
Fuel input Benchmark fuel 
emission factor 
Historical 
emissions 
Benchmark based 
correction factor 
1. Standardized output-
based (or capacity-
based) benchmarks 
Site specific info on 
capacity  * 
Standardized  sector 
load factor 
Emissions per unit of site 
specific output 
or 
specific energy consumption 
* emissions per 
unit of fuel (standardized) 
x x x x 
2. Site Specific Output-
based benchmarks 
Site specific info on 
capacity* 
Site specific load 
factor 
Same as 
Type 1 x x x x 
3. Input-based 
benchmarks x x Site specific fuel use 
Standardized fuel 
emission factor 
 
x x 
4. Site-specific energy 
efficiency factors x x x x 
Site specific 
historical 
emissions 
Industry/ Sector 
specific value for 
emission 
Source: Summary based on proposals in Entec UK Limited and NERA Economic Consulting (2005) 
Note: x = not used in benchmark computing 
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Annex Table 2 : Summary of different types of auctioning formats 
 
Source:  Authors description according to various sources61 
                                                 
61 Hepburn (2006), Cramton, P., and S. Kerr (2002), various internet sources related to the individual trading schemes 
 
 Type Description Real-life 
application 
Real-life 
application 
related to 
emission 
trading 
Uniform-price Bidders can submit bids at different prices. When the 
aggregated amount of all bidders (Q*) equals to the amount 
to auction set by regulator, all the bids for the Q* allowances 
obtain allowances at the market clearing price. 
 
Electricity 
Auction 
EU ETS Phase 
1 :  
Ireland, 
Hungary, 
Latvia, 
Denmark 
Vickrey price 
 
Winning bidders pay the price of bid by the second highest 
bidder for the units of emission permits.  
 
Similar type 
used at 
eBay 
auction 
- 
Single-
Round 
Auctions 
 
(Sealed 
Bid 
Auctions) 
Discriminatory 
price 
Bidders can submit bids at different prices. 
 When the aggregated amount of all bidders (Q*) equals to 
the amount to auction set by regulator,  the highest bids for 
the Q* allowances obtain allowances at their own bid prices 
 USA Acid Rain 
SO2 allowance 
auction 
Ascending 
(English)  clock  
The regulator - auctioneer regularly posts a sequence of 
raising prices. Bidders reveal the quantity they are to buy at 
the given price. The process stops when the aggregated 
demand (Q*) equals to the amount offered for sale. 
 
Auction of 
antiques 
Virginia NOX 
SIP Call 
Demand 
Schedule  
Multi round version of discriminatory price single-round 
auction 
 - 
Descending 
(Dutch) clock 
The auction starts with the highest price, which decrease 
with each round. In each round, bidders can “lock in” some 
amount to buy at the current offered or they can wait for the 
price to fall. The auction stops when the number of 
allowances locked in is greater than or equal to the amount 
dedicated to be auctioned by the regulator. 
 
Dutch Tulip 
Auction 
UK ETS  
Multi-
Round 
Auctions 
 
 
(Open 
Auctions) 
Shot clock The regulator - auctioneer regularly increase the prices. It 
stops when the total number of units requested falls to a 
threshold level = specified share of total amount offered for 
sale by regulator (e.g. 5%) + amount offered for sale. When 
the price stops, all bidders can submit a final set of bids in 
the form of quantities and prices (prices greater than the 
closing price) in so-called shoot-out round. The highest bids 
obtain allowances at their own bid prices; participants that 
did not enter into the shoot-out round pay the price of the 
previous round for the remaining permits. 
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Annex Table 3 : Comparison of Allocation Methodologies of National Allocation Plans in Phase 1 - Focused on Power Sector Allocation 
Country Allocation 
mech. 
Allocation Power Sector Note to Allocation A 
(Mt) 
Base Year 
Austria G+B Historical installation emissions multiplied by potential reduction factor and by 
compliance factor expressing the share of the historic installation in the industry 
emission. Potential reduction factor for lignite: 0.88 (corresponds to a reduction by 
12%), for natural gas 0is used; for a 0.96 (-4 % reduction). 
BAU forecast based on historic emission multiplied by 
emission reduction potential 
0 1998 -2001 
Belgium G+B Projected emissions *emission factor by fuel type*BAT benchmark (Flemish), 
Historic emissions* BAU with 5%reduction, benchmark(for gas using CCGT 
technology)(Walloon) 
Different for Flemish, Walloon and The Brussels capital 
regions. Based on the historical emission and projected 
emissions. 
0 2000-2002 
Bulgaria G no specific rule Allocation Rules same for all sectors. The quantity of 
allowances allocated to each installation each year is 
proportional to the product of emissions from the 
installations during the base year corrected with the 
projected increase in emissions in the sector compared to 
the base year. 
0 2002-2004 
Cyprus G no specific rule Development of the BAU scenario with reduction potentials 0 2001-2003 
Czech Rep. G no specific rule BAU forecast till 2007 based on historic emission. Growth 
Coefficients in individual sectors 
0 1998-2001 
Denmark G+A Allocation of allowances according to historical electricity production. Allocation is 
reduced slightly compared to the ceiling in 2003 and 2004. which, since 2001, have 
been covered by the Danish national quota system for large electricity producers 
BAU forecast based on historic emission reduced by 15% 
(Power sector bears major part of the reduction) 
5 1998-2002 
Estonia G no specific rule Allocation set no definite restrictions. Individual development 
trends at each installation were prepared by the operators. 
0 2000-2003, 
1995-2003 
only for heat 
power plants 
Finland G no specific rule Development of the BAU scenario with reduction potentials 0 1998-2002, 
in some 
cases 2000-
2003 
France G no specific rule Historic emission multiplied by national emission reduction 0 1998-2001 
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potential (0,97) and by industry growth factor 
Germany G+B for new 
entrants  
no specific rule The emission allowance issued to an installation is derived 
by multiplying its historical annualized CO2 emissions during 
the reference period by a standardized compliance factor 
0.9755 
0 2000-2002 
Greece G Stricter electricity compliance factor : 0,94 compared to other industries The emission allowance issued to an installation is derived 
by multiplying its historical annualized CO2 emissions during 
the reference period by a industry specific compliance factor 
0 2000-2003 
Hungary G+B for new 
entrants  
no specific rule Allowances to be allocated to each sector was determined 
uniformly on the basis of the projections assuming a BAU 
scenario 
2.4 1998-2001 
Ireland G+A Adjusted Compliance factor for power generation installation : 0,74 Development of the BAU scenario with reduction potentials 0.5 2002-2003 
Italy G+B(power 
sector) 
Differentiated and stricter growth rates were assumed (1.1% between 2000 and 
2005, -0.6% between 2005 and 2006, -0.3% between 2006 and 2007) that are 
multiplied by the emission in 2000. For Setting the installation allocation for 
electricity producers benchmark indicating the number of operation hours and 
emission coefficient 
Industry based growth rates multiplied by emission in base 
year 
0 2000-2003 
Latvia G+B Technology based fuel emission factors multiplied by emissions in the  base year Technology based fuel emission factors multiplied by 
emissions in the  base year 
0 1997, 2002 
or 2003 
Lithuania G+B+A Projected production multiplied by technology based benchmark. Allowances for 
auction are subtracted from the allocation to the power sector. 
Historic emission from the base year multiplied by emission 
reduction potential and by projected growth (industry specific 
growth). Different allocation for the power sector 
0.2 1998-2002 
Luxembourg G no specific rule  BAU scenario multiplied with reduction potentials0: 0,95 0 2001 
Malta G Allocation was done based on prediction of future electricity demand growth and 
energy efficiency improvement base on extrapolating the data in the base year 
Malta has only one sector - power generation sector - within 
the EU ETS. 
0 1995-2004 
Netherlands G+B(power 
sector) 
No expected sector growth allowed. The efficiency requirements concerned have 
been derived from the values used in the Benchmarking covenant (Separate 
regulation of the power sector prior EU ETS since 1999 concerning the voluntary 
energy efficiency commitments)  
The quantity of allowances for allocation per installation has 
been based on historic emissions, expected sector growth, 
the degree of energy efficiency (for combustion emissions) 
and a correction factor 0.97. 
0 2001-2002 
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Poland G Growth factor for electricity production sector 17% (2nd lowest industry growth 
factor). On the installation level there were reflected emission in the base year and 
the technical and achieved potential (=capacity of power plant utilization).  
Emission from the base year multiplied by the sector based 
growth factor 
0 1999-2002 
Portugal G+B for new 
entrants  
The allocation takes into consideration information on trends in demand and supply 
mix in accordance as per the projections. In this specific case, the allocation will be 
based on projections. The proposed correction results in a reduction of 1.8 MtCO2 in 
allowances allocated, compared with an allocation based on historical data. 
Historical Emissions multiplied by global adjustment factor 0 2000-2003 
Romania G no specific rule Combination of the historical approach and forecast 
approach. Growth factor 1,03-1,05 
0 2001-2004 
Slovakia G Planned production multiplied by emission factor Base year emission multiplied by industry growth factor or 
planned production multiplied by emission factor for several 
industries (energy, cement production) 
0 2000-2002 
Slovenia G+B 
(industry 
sector) 
Forecast emissions multiplied by sector emission reduction factor 0,894 stricter than 
for industry sector emission reduction (0,958) 
2 approaches: for Power sector and for Industry. For Power 
sector -see the column, for Industry : base year emissions 
multiplied by sector emission reduction, benchmarks for 
CHP 
0 1999-2002 
Spain  G no specific rule Emission projections based on historical emission levels. 
These projections were used to calculate each sector’s 
emission reduction capability for the purposes of allocation 
at sector level. 
0 2000-2002 
Sweden G+B for new 
entrants  
Correction factor is 0,8 for energy sector and 1 for other industries Base year emission multiplied by correction factor and 
corrected for projection of raw-material related emissions of 
non-energy sector 
0 1998-2001 
UK  G Power Station sector responsible for delivering the additional savings which the UK 
expects the EU ETS to deliver. Power sector has the greatest -21% change 
between annual emissions in 2003 and total allocation 
Allocations at sector level will be made on the basis of the 
sector projected emissions. Some sectors allowed growth, 
only power sector reduced significantly. 
0 1998-2001 
Source: Author’s own comparison of National Allocation Plan of EU 27(see Internet sources) 
Note: G=Grandfathering, B=benchmarking, A=Auctions, Base Year = Average Emissions in relevant years
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Annex Figure 1 : Total Deficit and Over-Allocation in Phase 1 EU ETS 
Total Gross Long and Gross Short Position
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Annex Figure 2 : Sector Deficit and Over-allocation in Phase 1 EU ETS 
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Source: Own computation according to the CITL data (see Internet Sources) 
Note: PH = power and heat, PP = paper production, OG = oil and gas production, CLG = cement, lime and 
glass, ME = metal production, OTHER = other installations 
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Annex Figure 3 : Short position in power sector 
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Source: Own computation according to CITL data (see Internet Sources) 
 
 
 
Annex Figure 4: EUA Price Development 
 
 
Source: PointCarbon data (see Internet Sources) 
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Annex Table 4 : Input Data for the Analysis - GDP Trends 
 GDP Forecast 
Relative 
development factor 
of economic growth 
2007-2011 
 Annual % change 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012-2020 
 
Relative 
development 
factor of 
economic 
growth 2012-
2020 
Austria 3.4% 2.2% 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.12 1.019 
Belgium 2.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 1.10 1.020 
Bulgaria 6.2% 5.8% 5.6% 5.2% 5.8% 5.8% 1.32 1.058 
Cyprus 4.4% 3.7% 3.7% 3.4% 3.6% 3.6% 1.20 1.036 
Czech Rep. 6.5% 4.7% 5.0% 4.1% 3.6% 3.6% 1.26 1.036 
Denmark 1.8% 1.3% 1.1% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.08 1.018 
Estonia 7.1% 2.7% 4.3% 8.1% 3.8% 3.8% 1.29 1.038 
Finland 4.4% 2.8% 2.6% 2.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.15 1.019 
France 1.9% 1.6% 1.4% 1.9% 2.4% 2.4% 1.10 1.024 
Germany 2.5% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.7% 1.7% 1.09 1.017 
Greece 4.0% 3.4% 3.3% 4.0% 2.8% 2.8% 1.19 1.028 
Hungary 1.3% 1.9% 3.2% 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% 1.14 1.035 
Ireland 5.3% 2.3% 3.2% 5.0% 3.5% 3.5% 1.21 1.035 
Italy 1.5% 0.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.9% 1.9% 1.06 1.019 
Latvia 10.3% 3.8% 2.5% 8.1% 5.4% 5.4% 1.34 1.054 
Lithuania 8.8% 6.1% 3.7% 7.1% 4.7% 4.7% 1.34 1.047 
Luxembourg 5.1% 3.6% 3.5% 3.8% 3.4% 3.4% 1.21 1.034 
Malta 3.8% 2.6% 2.5% 1.4% 3.7% 3.7% 1.15 1.037 
Netherlands 3.5% 2.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.12 1.019 
Poland 6.5% 5.3% 5.0% 3.7% 4.6% 4.6% 1.28 1.046 
Portugal 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.3% 2.7% 2.7% 1.10 1.027 
Romania 6.0% 6.2% 5.1% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 1.32 1.058 
Slovakia 10.4% 7.0% 6.2% 5.1% 4.5% 4.5% 1.38 1.045 
Slovenia 6.1% 4.2% 3.8% 3.7% 2.6% 2.6% 1.22 1.026 
Spain 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 3.3% 2.9% 2.9% 1.15 1.029 
Sweden 2.6% 2.2% 1.8% 2.8% 2.3% 2.3% 1.12 1.023 
UK 3.0% 1.7% 1.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 1.12 1.023 
   
Source:   
 
DG ECFIN (2008) 
Economic Forecasts 
Spring 2008 
 DG TREN (2007) 
European Energy and 
Transport - Trends to 2030 
- update 2007   
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Annex Table 5 : Input Data for the Analysis - CO2 Emissions 
 Trends to 2030 Update 2030 
Inputs for Scenario I. Inputs for Scenario II. 
 
 
CO2 Emissions to GDP (tonne of 
CO2/million Euro value year 2005 
Carbon Intensity Factor Adjusted Carbon Intensity 
Factor with emission reduction 
2,5% every 5 years 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
Austria 300.6 267.9 257.8 240.2 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Belgium 361.2 315.6 291.3 282.5 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Bulgaria 2101.9 1729.1 1341.6 1060.5 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Cyprus 539.7 487.1 377.0 320.2 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Czech Rep. 1151.3 935.0 741.2 637.8 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Denmark 234.8 210.7 190.4 175.0 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Estonia 1371.0 1038.8 911.1 751.1 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Finland 343.7 310.9 297.2 253.8 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
France 221.3 197.0 175.7 157.2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Germany 359.1 309.3 291.5 277.0 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Greece 531.2 465.5 396.6 363.6 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Hungary 619.5 539.8 481.7 433.3 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Ireland 283.3 245.3 208.3 182.7 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Italy 318.2 304.3 292.2 278.1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Latvia 569.2 473.1 416.3 361.9 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Lithuania 612.6 571.4 505.3 368.0 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Luxembourg 421.3 355.0 312.3 270.9 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Malta 652.5 585.8 413.0 323.0 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Netherlands 339.3 299.1 289.4 274.4 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Poland 1192.6 1011.6 850.8 714.7 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Portugal 416.9 387.7 370.6 346.3 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Romania 1131.3 923.2 748.0 650.1 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Slovakia 974.5 787.6 667.8 572.5 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Slovenia 551.0 509.8 452.6 432.4 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Spain 374.8 335.9 302.5 266.0 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 
Sweden 168.7 159.6 161.5 145.9 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
UK 312.3 272.7 247.5 218.7 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 
                   
Source: 
 
 
 DG TREN (2007) European 
Energy and Transport - Trends 
to 2030 - update 2007 
Computation from DG 
TREN (2007) 
Computation from DG 
TREN (2007) 
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 Annex Table 6 : Input Data for the Analysis - EU ETS Allocation and Emissions 
   Phase 2. 
Allocation 
In Mt CO2 p.a. 
Phase 1. 
Allocation 
Phase 1. Emissions 
 
Phase 3. Allocation 
 Average          
JI-CDM 
import 
limit p.a.           
 2005-2007 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Installations 
added in 
Phase 2 
Adjusted 
emission 
Phase 1 
2008-2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Austria 33 33.4 32.4 31.7 32.5 0.4 32.9 30.7 3.1 29.1 28.6 28.1 27.6 27.2 26.7 26.2 25.8 
Belgium 62.1 55.6 54.8 52.8 54.4 5.0 59.4 58.5 4.9 55.5 54.5 53.6 52.7 51.7 50.8 50.0 49.1 
Bulgaria 42.8 40.6 41 42.3 41.3 0.0 41.3 42.3 5.3 40.1 39.4 38.7 38.1 37.4 36.8 36.1 35.5 
Cyprus 5.7 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.2 0.0 5.2 5.5 0.5 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 
Czech Rep. 97 82.5 83.6 87.8 84.6 0.0 84.6 86.8 8.7 82.3 80.9 79.5 78.1 76.8 75.4 74.1 72.8 
Denmark 31 26.5 34.2 29.4 30.0 0.0 30.0 24.5 4.2 23.2 22.8 22.4 22.1 21.7 21.3 20.9 20.6 
Estonia 18.96 12.6 12.1 15.3 13.3 0.0 13.3 12.7 0.0 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.4 11.2 11.1 10.9 10.7 
Finland 45.5 33.1 44.6 42.5 40.1 0.4 40.5 37.6 3.8 35.7 35.1 34.4 33.8 33.3 32.7 32.1 31.5 
France 156.4 131.2 123.3 126.6 127.1 5.1 132.2 132.8 17.9 126.0 123.8 121.6 119.5 117.4 115.4 113.4 111.4 
Germany 499 474.0 477.6 487.0 479.5 11.0 490.5 453.1 90.6 429.9 422.4 415.0 407.8 400.7 393.7 386.9 380.2 
Greece 74.4 71.3 70 72.7 71.3 0.0 71.3 69.1 6.2 65.6 64.4 63.3 62.2 61.1 60.0 59.0 58.0 
Hungary 30.236 25.8 25.8 26.8 26.1 1.4 27.5 26.9 2.7 25.5 25.1 24.6 24.2 23.8 23.4 23.0 22.6 
Ireland 22.3 22.4 21.7 21.2 21.8 0.0 21.8 22.3 2.2 21.2 20.8 20.4 20.1 19.7 19.4 19.0 18.7 
Italy 215.7 225.5 227.1 226.0 226.2 0.0 226.2 195.8 29.4 185.8 182.5 179.3 176.2 173.2 170.1 167.2 164.3 
Latvia 4.63 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 0.0 2.9 3.4 0.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Lithuania 12.3 6.6 6.5 6.0 6.4 0.1 6.5 8.8 1.8 8.3 8.2 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.4 
Luxembourg 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.5 0.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Malta 2.944 2.0 2 4.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.1 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Netherlands 88.9 80.4 76.7 79.8 79.0 4.0 83.0 85.8 8.6 81.4 80.0 78.6 77.2 75.9 74.6 73.3 72.0 
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Poland 237.9 203.1 208.6 209.6 207.1 6.3 213.4 208.5 20.9 197.8 194.4 191.0 187.7 184.4 181.2 178.0 174.9 
Portugal 38.16 36.4 33.1 31.2 33.6 0.8 34.4 34.8 3.5 33.0 32.4 31.9 31.3 30.8 30.2 29.7 29.2 
Romania 84.2 70.8 71.5 71.5 71.3 0.0 71.3 75.9 7.6 72.0 70.8 69.5 68.3 67.1 66.0 64.8 63.7 
Slovakia 30.7 25.2 25.5 24.4 25.1 1.7 26.8 32.6 2.3 30.9 30.4 29.9 29.3 28.8 28.3 27.8 27.4 
Slovenia 8.7 8.7 8.8 9.0 8.8 0.0 8.8 8.3 1.3 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.0 
Spain 171.9 182.9 178.6 186.4 182.6 6.7 189.3 152.3 30.5 144.5 142.0 139.5 137.1 134.7 132.3 130.0 127.8 
Sweden 22.7 19.3 19.9 15.3 18.2 2.0 20.2 22.8 2.3 21.6 21.3 20.9 20.5 20.2 19.8 19.5 19.1 
UK 206 242.5 251.1 256.6 250.1 39.5 289.6 246.2 19.7 233.6 229.5 225.5 221.6 217.7 213.9 210.2 206.6 
 2246 2123 2141 2167 2144 84 2228 2083 278 1976 1941 1908 1874 1842 1810 1778 1747 
             * 1974 1937 1901 1865 1829 1792 1756 1720 
  
  
 
EC Press 
Release 
from 
7.12.2007 
CITL - (see Internet Sources)      
(as of May 2008) 
EC Press 
Release 
from 
7.12.2007
 
EC Press 
Release from 
7.12.2007 
Own Computation according to the EU ETS Revision Directive 
Proposal. (Annual reduction factor : 1.74% 
                    
 Note : * Adjusted allocation  for Phase 3 according to the EC communication  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
 
AAU Assigned Amount Unit 
BAT Best Available Technology 
BAU Business as usual 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CER Certified Emission Reduction 
CITL Community independent transaction log 
EC European Commission 
EUA European Union Allowances 
EU ETS European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
ETS Emission Trading Scheme 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
JI Joint Implementation 
NER New Entrants Reserve 
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
UNFCCC United Nation Convention on Climate Change 
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